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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with the colonial legacy 
of the national disunity in Nigeria and, it draws instances 
from post colonial events to illustrate the arguments. 
In analyzing the colonial attributes of national dis- 
unity one has to he aware of the fact that it is imposs- 
ible to attribute disunity to the activities of colonial 
rule alone. The causes of national disunity never work 
in isolation; they are intertwined and can reinforce each 
other. As such, national disunity can be studied from 
different perspectives. 
The colonial perspective is one and its contribution 
to the causes of national disunity is analyzed. To make 
the contribution strong, it was necessary to confine our 
analysis to the most important events that took place 
during colonial rule. These are amalgamation and the 
adoption of indirect rule as a uniform government. The 
methods and processes by which these actions were insti- 
tutionalized as well as their effects on intertribal 
relations are analyzed in some detail. 
This analysis reveals that British colonial poli- 
cies generated tensions and cleavages among tribal groups. 
Differential policies created inequalities between the 
Northern and Southern peoples. One result was that the 
difference between the Hausa-Fulani in the North and the 
1 
ITDO in the East was in time no longer simply that one group 
was Hausa-Fulani and the other was Iho, There arose two 
additional distinctions. The Hausa-Fulani remained predom- 
inantly Muslim and the Ibos became mainly Christians. 
Secondly, the differential effects of modernization and 
westernization elevated the Southern tribes who were pre- 
viously considered inferior to the Hausa-Fulani of the 
North. The latter gradually began to look as if- they were 
"backward" or "pre-modern". 
Amalgamation and indirect rule did not eliminate the 
prevailing cleavages and tensions but rather aggravated 
the situation. The very processes by which these policies 
were implemented further created a climate of suspicion and 
hatred among Nigerian tribal groups. The tensions natur- 
ally sharpened tribal consciousness thus intensifying t 
tribal animosity.. The accumulation of these grievances in- 
creased the potential for tribal conflict, the outbreak of 
which awaited only the slightest opportunity. The with- 
drawal of Colonial rule naturally provided the opportunity, 
and, post colonial Nigeria cannot help but become ridden 
with inter-tribal conflicts. 
The appalling slaughter of members of the Ibo tribe 
by the Hausa-Fulani in I966 , and the Nigerian civil war 
of 1967-1970 are vivid reminders that political conflict 
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An examination of contemporary national life in 
Nigeria reveals the primary and existential pervasiveness 
of disunityo Almost immediately after independence a 
series of conflicts and violence began to rip through the 
country. This culminated in the bloody secessionist 
movement of 19^7 to 1970 which tore the nation apart. 
In both human and material terms, disunity has done con- 
siderable harm to the nation. Statesmen and intellectuals 
alike have generally been content with deploring its 
existence but maintain different views as to its attri- 
butes • 
National disunity in Nigeria has been viewed by some 
writers as a continuation of the traditional tribal con- 
flicts; others attribute it to the termination of colonial 
rule which saw the end of a unity achieved under the force 
of an alien power; and, yet still, others view contempor- 
ary disunity as the result of tribal competition for 
scarce economic and political resources. The present 
writer sees in these arguments, a neglect of the colonial 
legacy of national disunity in Nigeria. 
Modern Nigeria owes its existence to colonialism. 
It is not suprising therefore that events which shaped 
the country's image took place during colonial rule. Fun- 
V 
damental policies were undertaken which largely determin- 
ed the shape, fom, direction as well as the future of 
the eoimtry* The period of colonial rule thus deserves 
central consideration in any explanations of national dis- 
unity in Nigeria. And, it is surprising that so little 
attention has been given to the colonial contribution to 
disunity* 
This research fills the gap in that it focuses on 
the colonial legacy of disunity in Nigeria. The causes 
of disunity and the form it took, a.s well as its conse- 
quences are analyzed in some detail. Events drawn from 
the past colonial era provide us with useful illustrations 
of the colonial legacy. 
It is hoped that this research will provide social 
scientists concerned v^ith national disunity vrith a new 
avenue of exploration. Similarly, I hope the research 
v/ill yield politically beneficial dividends to statesmen 
to whom prime knov/ledge of the colonial experience of 
Nigerian tribal population can help to give substance to 
decision and policy-making. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE PHYSICAL AND TRADITIONAL SOCIAL BACKGROUND 
The present chapter is an introduction to Nigeria. 
We will first locate Nigeria in space and describe the 
physical features. Then we will describe its tribal struc- 
ture and highlight the distinctive differences that 
separate the dominant groups from each. This is necessary 
as background information to the problems that confronted 
the colonial government. We will limit our description 
to the situation as it existed prior to colonialism. 
This means changes that resulted from colonialism are not 
reflected in the information. 
Nigeria is located on the West Coast of Africa. It 
stretches inland from the coast; and embraces most of the 
region drained by West Africa's most important river 
system - the rivers Niger and Benue. Its climate varies 
from equatorial rain forest in the South, Savanna in the 
middle belt to the semi-desert conditions in the North. 
The rivers Niger and Benue both flowing from different 
directions (West and East respectively) and joining to- 
gether almost in the centre of the country provide a sort 
of "Y" shaped view. This shape seems to have divided the 
country into three natural regions: Northern, Eastern 
and Western. As we will see presently, this natural.phy- 
sical division corresponds with the tribal structure we 
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shall next describe. 
The 1953 census count in Nigeria placed the popula- 
tion of the country at 31*2 millions.'*^ The people who 
made up this figure did not share a common background. 
They belonged to various tribal traditions. The number 
of tribal groups in Nigeria has been placed at about 250. 
As one would expect, these tribal groups were not equal, 
some were more in numbers as well as in strength than 
others. As a result, there are three dominant tribal 
groups: Hausa-Fulani (8 million), Yoruba (5 million) and 
Ibos (6 million). The rest of the tribes constitute the 
minorities. Even though the three dominant tribes are 
not exactly the same in population they seem to be equal 
in influence. In terms of territorial location, the 
Hausa-Fulani inhabit the Northern part of the country, 
the Yorubas, occupy the Western region and, Ibos dwell 
in the Eastern part, thus, corresponding to the natural 
divisions discussed above. The minority tribal communi- 
ties are scattered all over the country. 
We shall limit our description to the Hausa-Fulani, 
Yoruba and Ibo tribes because it is the actions and re- 
Nigeria: 1952-53 Census. London: 1955 P* 10* 
The latest census count was in 1975 and it showed that 
the country's population stood at 79*8 million. The 
accuracy of the count was disputed as a result of which 
the census has been cancelled. 
actions of these dominant tribes that have made the 
country’s history. The minority tribes have remained in 
the background often, merely as spectators of the inter- 
actions of the dominant ones. These three have very little 
in common. They differ from each other in social values, 
in religion, in civilization and in socio-political 
organizations. 
To understand the socio-political organization of 
the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Ibo, it is necessary to 
attempt some theoretical classification of African poli- 
tical systems generally.* These include patrimonial 
societies, chiefly societies and stateless or what is 
known in Anthropology as ’acephalous" societies. As our 
description will show, the Hausa-Fulani belong to the 
patrimonial category; the Yoruba, to the chiefly type; 
and,the Ibo fits the stateless dimension. We shall des- 
cribe the socio-political organization of each of the 
tribes with the help of these categories. 
I 
To say that the Hausa-Fulani socio-political organ- 
ization is patrimonial means that it exhibits the 
Fortes, M. and Evans-Pritchard, E. (eds.) African Poli- 
tical Systems. London: Oxford University Press, 19^0, 
pp. 6^-7 contain a classification of African tribal sys- 
tems based on Anthropological criteria. Therefore, our 
classification does not guite correspond with theirs. 
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principles of patrimonialism as outlined by Max Weber.* 
Hence, I shall mention only some of the highlights in 
this chapter. The Hausa-Fulani have a highly centralized 
state which is organized in hierarchies. A single ruler 
called the ’Sardauna* whose headquarters is in the town 
of Sokoto is the absolute ruler of the Hausa-Fulani State. 
He retains political domination over all others and, as 
the * master’ no one can effectively oppose him. As to 
how the master rules. Max Weber stated that "military and 
judicial authority are exercised without any restraint by 
the master as components of his patrimonial power".^ The 
Sarduana’s position as master of the state was reinforced 
by the fact that he was both the spiritual and temporal 
head of the Hausa-Fulani people. 
Beneath the ’Sarduana* are his subordinate or inter- 
mediary chiefs. They are known as ’Emirs’ and, each 
’Emir’ rules over an estate or a sort of province known 
as an Emirate.** The Emirs have no independent source 
of power. The office of Emir is the personal right of 
the Sarduana, not of the Emir himself. Once installed 
For the details of the principles of this system, the 
reader may turn to Chapter IV of this thesis. 
iMax Weber, Economy and Society. Vol. 3. New York: 
Bedminster Press, I968, p. 1013. 
In the sixties, there were about 38 Emirates ranging 
in population from 17,000 to 2,000,000. 
in power, his subjects could not depose him, only the 
Sarduana could do so.^ As a result, the Emirs retain 
their offices at the discretion of the Sarduana. But, 
their position is nevertheless crucial to the system of 
rule. 
As rulers of Emirates, the Emirs are closer to the 
people, in recognition of which they often are attached 
first and foremost to the Sarduana*s courts. This makes 
•Emirship* the pivotal point of the Hausa-Fulani state. 
Emirs, like the Sarduana have the ultimate power of deci- 
sion and their position as dictators was recognized by 
all. As Dudley has put it, "Their rule was based on a 
system of fief holding and clientage, the authority of 
the Emir being maintained through an administrative 
machinery..."^ The administrative machinery through 
which the Sarduana and his Emirs exercised their rule is 
one of the most renowned traditional bureaucratic insti- 
tutions ever found in Africa. As we shall see in chapter 
V, this institution provided Lord Lugard with a ready 
made bureaucracy for the launching of his indirect rule 
policy. 
^Whitaker, C. S. The Politics of Tradition; continuity 
and change in Northern Nigeria. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 19?0, pp. 260-61. 
^Dudley, B, J, Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria. 
London: Frank Cass, 1968, p. 11. 
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This bureaucratic institution is however not hased oh 
formal rational-legal norms. All regulations are purely 
discretionary and purely subjective as opposed to regula- 
tion by body of laws. To this end, civil administration 
and governance rest on a system of men rather than laws. 
Individuals may hold important positions in the bureau- 
cracy in the spheres of military and judicial service but 
recruitment is wholly based on patronage and loyalty to a 
ruler. Thus,through loyal service and devotion to an Emir 
j 
or Sarduana, an individual may win sympathy and can be 
elevated to positions such as ’.Alkali* (Court judge) , 
’Waziri' (Chief Minister) and *Wakili* (an Official Agent) 
etc. Because the Hausa-Fulani state revolves around the 
Emirs, the Sarduana appears to be much more distant from 
his communities. This combined with his personalized rule 
gives him the character of what Weber has called an 
’absolute despot*. 
Socially and economically, relations of domination 
and dependence characterize the structure of Hausa-Fulani 
society. Stratification consists mainly of the upper 
class and the lower class. The former is made up of a 
privileged aristocracy and the latter is comprised of 
peasants. These two classes are known in Hausa language 
as ’Sarakuna* and ’Talakuwa* respectively. The society 
is held together by norms of loyalty and fealty and, bonds 
6 
between the Sarakuna and Talakuwa (upper and lower classes) 
can be described as patron-client relationships. The sub- 
jects or peasants are viewed as existing for the ruling 
class and compulsory services are signs of subordinationa 
This situation conforms with Webers theory that "In a 
patrimonial state the most fundamental obligation of the 
subjects is the material maintenance of the ruler(s)".^ 
Oligarchically organized personal networks are the norms 
of Hausa-Fulani society. And, a system of taxation, com- 
pulsory labour services and honorary gifts to the rulers 
serve to keep the peasants in their servile position. 
All land is nominally owned by the *Sarduana’ and 
the peasants pay "land rent" for working on the land. 
The rent is levied on a cluster of villages and the amount 
paid by the peasant farmers in different areas varied 
according to the type of crop grown and suitability of 
land. As to the incidence of this form of tax, Sir 
Ahmadu Bello who until his death in 19^^, was ^Sarduana’ 
has stated in his autobiography that "the taxation, though 
not unjust in principle was sometimes unfair in its 
incidence." And, it was the peasants, "being the least 
influential and unvocal", who "suffered more than they 
should have".2 Villagers were also collectively liable 
^Max Weber, op. cit. , p. 1014. 
2- 
Sir Ahmadu Bello. My Life. Cambridge University Press, 
1962, p. 18. 
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for labour obligations and percentages of crop yield. 
This may have been a tactic for maintaining hereditary 
attachment to a village as the system made migration 
difficult f)r the inhabitants. It may have been acute 
for the peasants considering that land was not a saleable 
commodity. Being tied to the land but not owning it is 
synonymous to slavery. These conditions indicate that 
Hausa-Fulani society was not a democratic or egalitarian 
one. The form of domination is primarily as discussed 
by Webbero It is not domination based on legal norms of 
legitimacy but domination based on norms of fealty and 
maintained by the force of tradition. 
The principal facet of tradition that contributed to 
the maintenance of the patrimonial set up is religion. 
Islamic religion is the unifying force of the society. 
As a 'religion of obedience*, Islam prescribes social 
norms as well as sets goals. The people have great faith 
in the peirvasive force of this religion. Arabic litera- 
ture is the source of the wisdom of Islam and the people 
are literate in Arabic language. These elements of com*' 
monality and the basic patrimonial characteristics 
discussed above give peculiarity to the Hausa-Fulani 
society. Those facts distinguish them from their south 
Westerly neighbours —the Yorubas. 
8 
II 
Unlike the Hausa-Fulani^ the Yorubas are a chiefly 
tribe. We may describe Yoruba socio-political organiza- 
tion as less centralized constitutional monarchies. 
Yorubas are organized into kingdoms but the character and 
structure of these kingdoms differ from that of the Hausa- 
Fulani in some fundamental ways. First, there is no single 
dominant ruler comparable to the 'Sarduana* of the Hausa- 
Fulani; secondly, while rulership is not based on formal 
rational—legal ways, it is nevertheless not personalized; 
finally, the Yoruba Kingdoms do not have a renowned 
bureaucratic institution, but what they have is much more 
complex than the Hausa-Fulani system. The most distinc- 
tive feature of Yoruba monarchies is the availability of 
legitimate and institutional procedures which restrain 
the freedom of action of the chiefs. 
Yoruba political organization is grouped into king- 
doms and, an *Oba* (chief)* is at the head of each kingdom. 
Consequently, no single chief, has supreme authority over 
all the kingdoms. Fadipe has stated that "for the last 
120 years, Yorubaland has been split into several inde- 
pendent political units",1 and. Smith adds that these units 
* I - — 
Titles for chief vary from one area to the other. For 
instance, 'Alafin*, and 'Oni® are used in some parts but 
the most common title is ®0ba*• 
^Fadipe, N. A. The Sociology of the Yoruba. Ibadan: 
Ibadan University Press^ 1970, p. I98. 
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have "retained their identities politically and cultur- 
ally”o^ Yoruba Kingdoms are not hierarchically structured 
and the ®Obas* are relatively independent from each other. 
As such rivalry and competition has often characterized 
relations between each domain. The selection of an ’Oba* 
is far more (though not purely) democratic than the 
Hausa-Fulani ruler. Individuals can contest for selection 
as an *Oba* when they meet certain qualifications, one 
of which is wealth. This criterion is facilitated by the 
fact that traditionally, individuals could own land, 
thus accounting for the presence of wealthy independent ‘ 
landowners. 
Tradition (rather than Islam* as among the Hausa- 
Fulani) dictates Yoruba norms, values^ mores as well as 
set goals. It also sets limits for the Oba*s actions and 
the people are aware of the thin line which separa.tes him 
from his people. To this end, the Oba*s subjects would 
not allow acts which by tradition are considered exploita- 
tive. In this respect, the relationship between the Oba 
and his subjects is not based on fealty (like the Hausa- 
Fulani) but is nevertheless based on loyalty. The 
^Smith, Robert. Kingdoms of the Yoruba. Londons Methuen, 
1969, Po 15. 
The Yoruba area now known as Kwara State was conquered 
and maintained under Hausa-Fulani rule. Hence the people 
have adopted Islam as their religion. In terms of lan- 
guage, both Yoruba and Hausa are widely spoken. 
10 
fidelity is not purely one-sided aind is held together by 
norms of reciprocity. Thus, the Oba can risk his status 
ajid legitimacy if he exploits his subjects. Moreoever, 
the office of Oba is not the personal right of the ruler 
and remains easily replaceable. 
All lands are not royal domains and, the presence 
of a landed nobility tends to diffuse the class system. 
There is not much disparity in the stratification system: 
the gap between the upper and lower class is narrower. 
This is because there is leverage for upward mobility 
through competition and industry. The independent landed 
aristocracy exists as an intermediary link between peasants 
and the ruling class. The existence of this landed 
nobility make it difficult for the Obas to force the 
peasants to submit to their personal edicts. In this way 
the landed aristocrats protect themselves against the 
Obas and thus may sometimes protect the peasants from the 
tyranny of an Oba* s rule. 
Traditionally, public expenditure centred around 
projects such as infrastructure (roads and bridges)^ 
erection and maintenance of town walls, the cleaning and 
maintenance of sacred groves and palaces, as well as for 
military purposes. To meet these demands, inhabitants 
were required to pay taxes in the form of levies. There 
were two types: labour levy and cash levy. Labour levy 
11 
was in the form of rendering customary labour services 
in support of special circumstances eg. military service 
etc. Of the cash levy, the most important are the 'tolls* 
which were levied on inhabitants as well as on strangers 
in the town. Other sources of cash revenue include fees 
and fines that resulted from the administration of justice. 
On the whole, the incidence of taxation did not weigh 
heavily on the peasants and they enjoyed more freedom 
than their Hausa-Fulani counterpart. 
This is not to say that Yoruba socio-political struc- 
ture reflected democracy pure and simple. But it was 
democratic to some extent. As commented by Professors 
Okediji and Okediji, "one of the traditional attributes 
of the political organization of the various Yoruba com- 
munities was their democratic nature".^ This is indicated 
in the case of ’Ondo* kingdom where every community auid 
hence every extended family was directly represented in 
the government of the community. Democratic values hold 
the respective Yoruba kingdoms together. But, by far the 
most important unifying force is the tradition of common 
descent from *Oduduwa*.* The Yoruba people also have a 
common language heritages "Yoruba" language is widely 
^See Professors F. 0. Okediji and Q. 0. Okedijis® intro- 
duction in N. A. Fadipe, op. cit. . p. 14. 
* 
Believed to have, been sent from Heaven by the creator 
called "Olorun", which means owner of the sky. Such 
myths and legends about origins of people abound in 
Africa and elsewhere. 
12 
spoken except for occasional dialects. The only situation 
when one Yoruba would not understand the other is when 
one speaks in 'deep* dialect. But deep dialects are not 
commonly used. In terms of religion some part of Yoruba 
(as already indicated) is Moslem but the majority of them 
were animists before becoming Christians» In this respect, 
they are like their South Eastern neighbours — the Ibos. 
Ill 
To the south of the river Benue and east of the river 
Niger is the eastern part of the country which is inhabit- 
ed by the Ibo tribe. Contrary to the condition of Hausa- 
Fulani and the Yoruba, the Ibos are known to have no 
indigeneous, traditional centralized political organiza- 
tion. As such, the largest political unit in traditional 
Iboland was the Clan, also known as a commune. Beyond 
that, the Ibo recognizes no distant, unrelated authority 
such as the 'Sarduana* and the *Oba*. The commune con- 
sists of blood related villages and, the only authority 
the Ibo recognized was that of the family head of the 
commune. Writes Meek, "The most characteristic feature 
of the Ibo society is the almost complete absence of any 
higher political or social unit than the commune".^ 
T 
Meek, C. K. Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe. 
London Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 3. 
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Because of the absence of a central authority, there are 
no real chiefs to whom obedience is paid. This is the 
reason why Ibos appear to some observers as anarchists 
at heart. 
Ibo communes are based on common factors such as 
ancestry, loyalty, complementarity in economics as well 
as religious shrines. Thus, a commune has a common meet- 
ing centre that serves both as a ritual, as a market as 
well as a political centre. When member villages of a 
commune meet in .their common ground, they do so as equals. 
There is no single individual, chief or village that 
exercises authority over others. Each member village may 
have a village council of elders and council of title- 
holders* who enjoy a certain degree of authority in the 
village. 
Yet, such authority is far from the Yoruba type of 
constitutional authority and from the Hausa-Fulani des- 
potism. Individuals in Iboland could become titleholders 
for a variety of reasons. It could be attained through 
industry and wealth: success and achievement are highly 
valued. Or, the authority can be acquired by the simple 
fact of being the eldest living descendant of a certain 
man or still, by inheritance. Alternatively, it may just 
The title may vary from one part of Iboland to the other 
but the most commonly used is iOkpara*. 
be due to one's role as a ritual leader, a rainmaker or 
leader of a rain shrine cult. Whatever the attributes 
of a titleholder, one thing that is clear is that his 
authority does not entail more than a mere spokesman for 
the village. He has no traditional claim to chiefly 
office. As such, he is not a law maker and does not en- 
force norms nor collect taxes from the villagers. Hence, 
Crocker could only conclude that the authority of the 
titleholders is far from complete.^ 
Yet, in spite of the absence of a centralized 
hierarchy of authority relations, order and social solid- 
arity are effectively maintained throughout the commune, 
This seems to be due to the high value placed on egali- 
tarian principles. Consequently, the ordinary Ibo man 
has as much right as the titleholder or anybody else in 
deciding the affairs of this community. This political 
equality is also reflected in their socio-economic arrange 
ment. No one has monopoly over land or other resources 
and, this means everyone has equal access to the resources 
This is because land is a communai property and every 
living generation is only an apprentice or caretaker to 
it. This situation may have been due to the pressure of 
ecological conditions! for, the Ibos had one of the 
^Crocker, W, R. Self-Government for the Colonies. 
London: George Allen and Unwin, 19^9, p. 5^* 
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highest population densities in Africa and resources were 
very scarce. 
Under this condition, monopoly of resources "by one 
individual or group would mean starvation for others. 
Another argument attempts to attribute Iho egalitarian- 
ism to their traditional* values of success and achievement 
through competition. As we have seen, a particular 
person could win the respect of others or become a title- 
holder if he distinguishes himself in industry and wealth. 
In this respect, the Ibo is a diametrical opposite of the 
Hausa-Fulani citizen to whom loyalty and fealty to his 
superior is the only way he could move up. Suffice to 
say that these values produce among the Ibos the greatest 
sense of 'individualism* , unmatched by any other Nigerian 
tribe. Because of these distinctive characteristics, 
the Ibos are sometimes referred to as the "Jews of Africa".^ 
The Ibo social organization did not feature a re- 
fined class structure. Among the Hausa-Fulani royalty 
furnished a privileged class and, in Yorubaland aristo- 
cracy combined with a landed nobility created an upper 
class. But, among the Ibos where neither royalty nor 
aristocracy derived, stratification took the form of 
statuses. The status system classifies people into 
X . . 
Gunther, John. Inside Africa. New York:: Harpers, 
1975, P. 760. 
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ascribed and achieved statuses« The ascribed category 
consists of those classified as free-born, slave, male 
and female age grades'as well as priestly descendants. 
Of the achieved status, there are titleholders as well as 
membership in a voluntary association based on prestige, 
ambition, etc. So basic are these ascribed and achieved 
units of relationships that rights and privileges are 
associated with each. For instance, "the servile (known 
in the local language as *Ohu®) may not marry a free- 
born" (also known as *Nwadiana'^) In addition, the free- 
born as the highest beneficiary of the system can become 
a titleholder. He alone can participate in certain 
ritual activities as well as inherit certain property. 
Thus, the difference between the free-born ajid the servile 
is based on social prestige rather than economics. 
Therefore, the Ibo society may be viewed theoretically 
as classless. 
The absence of a public machinery of a significant 
kind in Iboland means that huge public expenditure such 
as that required to maintain a patrimonial and monarchi- 
cal system was non-existent. Therefore, taxation in 
Iboland was not as important as elsewhere. Taxation took 
the form of fines for infringement of the civil order and 
^Nzimiro, Ikenna. Studies in Ibo Political Systems. 
London s Frank Cass , 1972 , pp. 24-25. An individual* s 
social status may rise and fall depending on his be- 
haviour in the community. By committing certain 
offences, a title holder could forfeit his title and 
become a servile. 
17 
of levies for the performing of civil activities such as 
ritual offerings* The most important public offering is 
that offered to the God (known locally in different names 
Chukwu, Chineke, Ala, etc.). As soon as the priests and 
elders determine that God required propitiation, an 
estimate of the cost is made. Thereafter, they set in 
motion a method of tax collection, the incidence of which 
is borne equally by every member - village of the commune 
as well as equally by every inhabitant of a village. To 
illustrate this process, we must quote Meek at length. 
We shall assume as did Meek that the total cost of the 
offering is estimated at £5 (about $10)* Accordingly? 
the elders of each division would then 
direct that their two subdivisions should 
each contribute fel.5 (about $3). The 
next stage would be that the elders of 
each subdivision would call on the various 
households to contribute equally; or they 
might say that all grown up men should 
contribute so much; or they might call on 
the women to contribute half, and 
exempt young men on the ground that 
they were accustomed to render other 
public services such as building bridges, 
cleaning paths, or (in the olden days) 
fighting enemies. Very poor or sick 
people would not be called on to contri- 
bute.! 
If this levy may be called tax at all, it must be so 
called with reservations. For, it does not compare 
with the exploitative exactions that the Emirs and Obas 
levied on their respective subjects. 
^Meek, C. K. op. cit., p. 27* 
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The practical conclusions to he drawn from an exam- 
ination of the nature of the traditional socio-political 
organization of the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruha and Iho is that 
fundamental differences separate them from one another. 
They did not share similar experiences with respect to 
civilization, traditional custom, religion and even tem- 
perament o This is due to the historical circumstances 
that moulded each tribe. The one evolved a patrimonial 
system; the other a monarchical set up and still, the 
other a stateless system. But, each of these tribal 
systems was dynamic on its own right; it worked for its 
adherents. 
However, these systems ceased to be dynamic when con- 
fronted by a powerful modern state. They invariably 
lose their equilibrium and become fluid, marginal or take 
on a new shape. The most fundamental disturbance of the 
stability of Nigeria’s tribal systems resulted from 
colonialism. And, colonial rule was primarily the con- 
frontation of these systems by British civilization made 
up largely of differing ideals, modes of thought and aims. 
How did these affect the tribes? The following paragraphs 
will describe briefly early European influence in Nigeria 
prior to formal colonization. 
Nigeria’s highly differentiated tribal systems have 
existed for as long as is known of their pre-colonial 
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histories. They have lived through two significant early 
phases of European influences in Nigeriao First, there 
was the slave trade which lasted from 1480 to I807 in 
which a large number of able bodied West Africans were 
exported to the Americas and the Islands of the West 
Indies. The adaptation of the tribal systems to the re- 
quirements of the slave trade was not without conflicts 
but the effects were felt largely in reduced economic 
productivity. As a result, the political stability of 
the tribal organizations saw little disorientation. 
Secondly, there was the era of "legitimate" trade 
which followed the abolition of slave trade. Nigeria was 
thought to have offered exceptional opportunities for 
legitimate trade and, this civilized trade in goods led 
to the scrajnble among European firms to acquire exclusive 
commercial rights in the area. This movement was given 
legitimacy by the Berlin conference of I885 and subse- 
quently led to a generalized partition of Africa by 
European firms. Commercial rights became synonymous with 
territorial rights. Eventually, the area now known as 
Nigeria became the jurisdiction of a single company.* 
■ 
The Royal Niger Company was an amalgam of three influ- 
ential English firms (the West African' Company, Miller 
Brothers and, James Pinnock and Co.) thus representing 
the single largest and most influential firm in Nigeria. 
It was formed in November 18?9 and was then known as the 
United African Company. In 1881 the name was changed to 
the National African Company and, in 1886 it was again 
changed to the Royal Niger company (R.N.C.) 
20 
The Royal Mger Company first monopolized commercial 
rights over Mgerian territory and later acquired adminis- 
trative and political control as well^ In a series of 
treaties initiated by the company, Coastal and hinterland 
tribal chiefs and kings in Mgeria "signed documents pur- 
porting to trajisfer to the company their entire rights on 
both bajcks of the Mger, Benue and tributary rivers" 
The ceding of territorial rights to the Royal Mger com- 
pany and its assumption of administrative and political 
prerogatives did not produce disorganization among Mgeria*s 
tribal systems. As Norton Cook has stated, the company 
"exerted relatively little influence upon native institu- 
tions".2 This may have been’due in part to the fact that 
Nigeria* s tribal systems were dynamic in resisting outside 
influences and, also to the limited activities of the 
Royal Niger Company» The activities of the Royal Niger 
Company however paved the way for formal colonization of 
Nigeria by the government of Britain» What are the impli- 
cations of this transition to the people of Nigeria? 
In 1900, Britain took over Nigeria from the Royal 
Niger Company and subsequently established colonial rule. 
This had far reaching implications for the fate of the 
^Hargreaves, John. Prelude to the Partition of West 
Africa. London; Macmillan, 19^3, PP*^ 329-330o 
2 
Cook, Arthur N. British Enterprises in Nigeria. London; 
Frank Cass, 196^, p. 57« 
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traditional tribal organizations which the R.N.C. left 
largely intact. First, it means largely that Nigeria was 
to be moulded in the ways that suited the interests of 
Britain. Secondly, it also means that the coercive might 
of Britain could be brought to bear on the natives to 
force compliance to British interests. How to carry out 
her objectives in a highly differentiated and complex 
tribal situation was difficult for the British authori- 
ties. 
How would Britain deal with differential reactions 
and varied degrees of adaptation to her rule of Nigeria*s 
tribal groups? In this situation Britain’s policies and 
objectives were likely to please some tribes and hurt 
others, especially given her tendency to classify Niger- 
ians into suprior or inferior tribes and use of this 
division as the basis of evolving policy in different parts 
of the country. To this end, colonial rule produced ten- 
sions and conflicts among Nigerians. Herein lies the 
beginnings of tribal disorganization, tribal exploita- 
tion, the generation of tribal conflicts and, ultimately, 
the sources of disunity. Before we analyze disunity in 
Nigeria from this perspective, it is appropriate to review 
the existing explanations of disunity. 
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CHAPTER II 
EXPLANATIONS OF NATIONAL DISUNITY 
This chapter will explore three broad perspectives 
arising from different explanations of national disunity. 
There are seven explanations and it is convenient to 
group them into three headings: social perspective, 
Political Approach, and Diffusionist dimension. Each of 
these perspectives is made up of different schools of 
thought as follows: 
A) Social perspectives: (1) Social Anthropological school 
(2) Cultural-pluralist school 
(3) Ethnolinguistic school 
B) Political perspectives: (4) Political scientists* 
view 
(5) Marxist explanation 
C) Diffusionist perspectives: (6) Modernization school 
(?) Dependency school 
The grouping of these seven schools into three perspec- 
tives is based on their relatedness and this will facili- 
tate our summary of the themes involved. It will be seen 
as our discussion proceeds that the seven schools share 
a common tribal orientation, that is, a common tendency 
to attribute disunity to tribalism characterizes these 
approaches. We begin by clarifying the concepts tribe 
and tribalism. We conclude the chapter with a discussion 
of the principal weaknesses of these schools and why the 
present research must be undertaken. 
TRIBE; The term tribe has been widely used in the 
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literature on national unity. Yet, the term seems to 
mean different things to different scholars. Some use 
it to refer to large ethnolinguistic units? others, to 
"any group of people distinguished by its members and 
others on the basis of cultural-regional criteria".1 Yet 
still there are those who define a tribe simply as 
a unit of social and political organiza- 
tion which occupies a defined area of 
land and comprises a defined number of 
people2 
These sort of definitions, one stressing language, 
another culture and the other politics seems to suggest 
that the meaning of ‘tribe’ may vary according to the phe- 
nomenon or problem studied. Or, more accurately, that 
* tribe‘ like many other terms may have different refer- 
ents in different social situations. 
However, from the above definitions, we can identify 
certain basic general characteristics of a tribe ? it is 
culturally and linguistically homogeneous, has a sub- 
sistence economy and is self-contained and politically 
autonomous. A tribe may be literate or illiterate but 
its technology is relatively simple. These are the 
^Gulliver, P. H. Tradition and Transition in East Africa; 
Studies of the Tribal Element in the Modern Era, London? 
1969, p. 2k. 
^Chitepo, H. "The Passing of Tribal Man; A Rhodesian View". 
Journal of Asian and African Studies. Vol. 5-6, 1970-7X\. 
p. 11. 
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qualities of a tribe. But, do we still have tribes in 
the world of today? If we rely on the above characteris- 
tics then, we obviously no longer have tribal societies« 
It must be argued that the world-wide expansion of 
capitalism in the wake of European industrialism coupled 
with a communication/technological revolution has since 
brought practically every known human group within some 
foreign influence.'*' As a result of this incorporation, 
those entities we are used to calling 'tribes' have 
undergone changes either materially or ideologically. 
Subsequently, they are no longer isolated, have lost 
their political and cultural autonomy? they have acquired 
some foreign language or at least new ideas. Economically, 
they have become involved directly or indirectly in the 
wider capitalist market economy. In general, the pre- 
sent lifestyle of any human group of today, including the 
most primitive communities, reflect the distant complex 
of the industrial world and as such are incompatible with 
tribal society. It is against this background that one 
author has hinted that when we speak of a tribe, we are 
referring tos "an entity pre-dating capitalism and 
colonialism".1 Thus, while one could speak of tribal 
¥ 
For more on. the Capitalist-world system,, see Immanuel 
Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-System> Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 1979» 
^John Saul, "The dialectic of Class and Tribe", in 
Race and Class, XX, 4, 1979, P* 349* 
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societies prior to colonialism, there are no such societies 
in a post-colonial era. It becomes necessary, therefore, 
that the concept ethnic groups be used to designate con- 
temporary tribal societies since it is inclusive of the 
changes undergone by the groups* However, we shall retain 
the traditional usage of the term tribe not simply because 
it continues to be widely used but also because it provides 
us with the theoretical value to understand its abstract, 
'tribalism’^. We shall use 'ethnic groups* only in so far 
as it aids in the understanding of our discussion. 
TRIBALISM; Tribalism also can mean different things 
to different people. In many instances, it has been 
equated with instability, with nationalism and even with 
disunity. But, one scholar has used tribalism to refer 
specifically to the carrying over from pre-colonial era 
of certain tribal characteristics into the post-colonial 
period.^ The continued retention of primordial elements, 
namely, native culture and institutions, symbols, values 
and beliefs is seen as detrimental to stability in the 
post-colonial era. Tribal societies do exist, sharing 
their corporate feeling of oneness but they are also be- 
^Here Southall seems to be justifying the validity of the 
term tribe while disputing the argument that tribes are 
non-existent today. For, by acknowledging that certain 
human communities still exhibit or have retained their 
traditional symbols, values and beliefs, he is implying 
tribes are actually existing. Southall, A. W, "The 
illusion of Tribe", Journal of Asian and African Studies, 
Vol. 5-6, 1970-71, p. 30. 
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coming politically conscious. It is their politicization 
that generates friction and that is what is known as 'tri- 
balism* o Tribalism threatens stability in the new states 
because it 
thrives on ethnic group loyalties which 
undermine wider loyalties to emerging 
national states. 
In a multi-tribal society, when a particular tribal group 
strives to dominate or to resist domination by or assimi- 
lation into another tribe, such a tribe is said to exhibit 
tribalism. This is more so because these tribal groups, 
acting as collectivities differ from each other in senti- 
ments, aspirations and interests. Therefore, 'the behaviour 
of a particular tribal collectivity might provoke a 
defensive or aggressive response from the other. 
We can thus speak of patterns of tribalism or 
patterns of tribal behaviour. Some tribal groups may ex- 
hibit defensive tribalism. This occurs when a particular 
group is engaged in resistance to real or imagined threats 
to its interests. Other tribes may engage in aggressive 
tribalism by initiating actions that encroach on or 
threaten the existence of other groups. Western examples 
of these patterns are the current developments in French 
speaking Canada and in Flemish speaking parts of Belgium. 
^Sklar, R. L. The Contribution of Tribalism to National- 
ism in Western Nigeria. Journal of Human Relations ^ VIII, 
3-^, Spring-Summer, i960, p. 407. 
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In both casesp linguistic/cultural groups are mobilized 
to defend or expand their interests. While these countries 
may be blessed with mechanisms for resolving their group 
conflicts, in Africa where such procedures are largely 
lacking, tribalism becomes extremely rampant. This sit- 
uation has led Legum to conclude that: 
Tribalism is Africa’s natural condition, 
and it is likely to remain so for a long 
time to come.i 
Tribal loyalties and identities are very strong in Africa. 
The tribe is stronger than the individual, it is stronger 
than the nation and it seems to be getting stronger rather 
than weaker. It is appropriate to ask why? To answer 
this question, we must begin our exploration of the various 
schools of explanation. 
We begin with the schools that comprise the 
SOCIAL PERSEECTIVES: 
1) Social Anthropological School: advocates of this 
school include Kimble and Van den Berghe.* They posit 
that post-colonial societies contain alarmingly numerous 
tribal groups among whom social relationships are still 
^Legum, Colin.. "Tribal Survival in Modern African Politi- 
cal Systems", Journal of Asian and African Studies. 
Vol. 5-6, 1970-71, p. 102. 
•jf - 
Kimble., George. Tropical Africa: Society and Polity. 
Vol. 2, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, I960? and 
Van den Berghe, Pierre. Social Problems of Change and 
Conflict. Los Angeles: University of California, 1965- 
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mainly primary. Here the structure of society based on 
common blood ties, family, kin and tribe is seen to be 
incompatible with modern societies. It is argued that 
within the tribal congruities, individual personal identity 
is enmeshed in the 'idols of the tribe’, that is, the 
symbolic meaning given to group differences in body, name 
and history. For the individual, "the highest and only 
loyalty is loyalty to the family, kin and tribe" 
That the individuals respond to a primaJL impetus to 
belong, to identify or for that matter to remain attached 
to their tribal units means that they are indeed tradi- 
tional. Identifying with one tribe signifies that one 
does not identify with another; every in-group implies 
the counterpart of out-groups. Moreover, when non- 
identif ication with other groups is expressed in the 
political context not only as a phenomenon in the minds 
of political actors but also in the statistical arithmetic 
that often exists between tribes and political positions, 
friction may develop. Such situations might lead some 
groups to reassert their uniqueness over the others. In 
Van den Berghe's view, this process is perpetuated and 
reinforces tribal heterogeneity. This results in lack of 
national integration and of complementarity between the 
component groups of the society.2 
^Kimble, George, op. cit. , p. ^38. 
2 Van den Berghe. op. cit. , p. 78“79«. 
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Social Anthropologists must he criticized for their 
narrow explanation of tribalism. If the multiplicity of 
tribes per se aids in disunity as they claim^ we are 
forced to ask; why then is Switzerland, for example, the 
most ethnically heterogeneous country in Europe, relatively 
stable and united? This and other examples around the 
world lead us to argue that it is not just tribal commun- 
ities per se that aids in conflicts but rather, the 
appendages of tribal groups namely, culture. 
2) Cultural-Pluralist* School of explanation; Himmel- 
strand and Smith fall into this category.** In 
explaining tribalism, this school addresses not the 
multiplicity of tribal groups as do social Anthropologists 
but rather, the cultural attributes of the groups. Their 
argument is that the tribal structure of post-colonial . 
societies is a diversity of systems of life or cultural 
entities. These continually condition the values, senti- 
The concept pluralism was first developed by J. S. 
Furnival who identified it with tropical societiesJ see 
his Colonial Policy and Practice^ Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1948. But, the concept has been re- 
fined by contemporary pluralists to cover any group 
which is culturally and socially homogeneous. 
Ulf Himmelstrand*s "Tribalism", Regionalism, Nationalism 
and Secession in Nigeria; in Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan 
(edo). Building States and Nations. Beverly Hills; Sage 
Riblication, 1973o And, M. G. Smith, "Pluralism in Pre- 
colonial African Societies" and "Institutional and Poli- 
tical Conditions of Pluralism", in M. G. Smith and Leo 
Kuper (edsc). Pluralism in Africa. Berkeley; University 
of California Press, 19^9» 
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merits and aspirations of their adherents. That these cul~ 
tural entities as reflected in religion, habits, social 
mores and other customary practices have retained their 
vitality is correct. Some of the cultures differ widely 
from each other with the result that certain practices 
that may be valued in one culture can be *taboo* in the 
othero* Such differences in culture have led to inescap- 
able division of societies into the ’clean' and 'unclean', 
'pure' and 'unpure' and ultimately, primitive and 'cultur- 
ed* categories. Derogatory symbols of this type are what 
Himmelstrand has described in a word as 'stranger'** and 
strangers are dispised. This process has wider implica- 
tions as Himmelstrand writes s 
In places where traditional values pre- 
vail or .are nurtured for political 
reasons, a stranger simply does not rank 
as high on the social scale than a local 
person whose qualifications are otherwise 
Most serious of all is circumcision which is known to 
prohibit inter-marriage and/or intimate physical and 
emotional contact between tribes who practice it and 
those who don't. Across almost every country in Africa, 
one would find groups who are divided by their cultures 
including eating habits. 
E-* 
He tells us in his classic example that the term stranger 
was commonly used for 'aliens* from other regions or tri- 
bal communities within.the country. When members of the 
Ibo tribe, for example, are referred to as strangers, it 
means savages and people who performed odd jobs. 
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on the same level or, perhaps, even 
lower6X 
When these labels are used to evaluate candidates for 
federal positions, sharp cleavages arise. 
We must agree with the culturalists that most post- 
colonial societies are pluralistic in their cultural 
settings. They vary from primitive savages to advanced 
cultures, from the hunting and gathering pigmies to the 
agricultural Luba cultures in Zaire, and from animists 
to Moslems in Nigeria, each of which moulds its adherents 
in different ways. Consequently, there does not exist a 
homogeneous culture comparable to the assumed ’melting 
pot’ in the United States.* This reference is not meant 
to equate any Third World country with American society. 
Rather, the point is that if a homogeneous culture can be 
forged out of diverse cultures, why hasn’t this been done 
in Nigeria, for example? Of course, Nigeria is not a 
country of immigrants. Moreover, the cultural entities 
are territorially based, factors which distinguish Nigeria 
^See Ulf Himmelstrand’s article on Tribalism in Eisenstadt 
and Rokkan eds., Building States and Nations, SageJ 
Beverley Hills, l'^?^, PP« 
For some time, the ’melting pot*, the merging of differ- 
ent cultures into indistinguishable sameness with "real" 
Americans, was. a popular way of viewing American society. 
However, today, multiculturalism rather than the ’melt- 
ing pot’ has gained popularity. Perhaps, Great Britain 
is an example of a nation that has homogeneous culture. 
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and which reinforce the cohesiveness of cultural units* 
Butj this cultural-pluralist school, by designating 
pluralism to be the root cause of tribal conflicts seem to 
imply that tribalism is rooted in cultural identities. 
And therefore, it leads us to believe that African societies 
will always be wrecked by irremedial internal conflicts. 
This attitude of course, serves mainly to reinforce a state 
of hopelessness. It must be denied that tribal conflicts 
are natural to cultural-plural situations. Significantly, 
the approach of this school is purely descriptive and 
static. It claims to have focused attention on culture 
and yet neglects the crucial rule of language, a facet of 
culture. To the linguistic factor we will now turn. 
3) Ethnolinguistic School; Belonging to this school of 
thought are Devenport and Gupta.* The school emphasizes 
the linguistic characteristics of tribal societies. Look- 
ing at pluralism but from the standpoint of language, this 
school emphasize the disadvantage of having numerous 
languages within a particular nation or country. It views 
most post-colonial states as exhibiting many different 
* 
See Devenport, T. R. H. "Nationalism and Conciliations 
The Bourassa-Hertzog Posture" The Canadian Historical 
Review, #44, 19^3; Das Gupta "Sociolinguistics and the 
Language Problems of the Developing Countries" in Fishman, 
Ferguson and Das Gupta (eds.) Language Problems of Devel- 
oping Nations. New York: John Wiley, 1968. 
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and unrelated languages. Many of these are hardly liter- 
ary languages (in so far as they have no literacy tradition) 
But, they have been for ages transmitted orally. 
The importance of language as a medium of communica-' 
ticn and as a popular cultural carrier is quite familiar 
to us. It seems natural that a people sharing in a common 
language etc. should constitute a nation. However, pro- 
blems arise when the opposite is the case. And, the 
situation appears even more perplexing when linguistic 
differences stem from diverse tribal origins. In this 
situation writes Devenport, language becomes 
"a medium of expression, .... the form 
of expression whereby a people can main- 
tain its cultural distinctiveness and 
yearning for autonomy. 
Language thus serves the political function of motivating 
and mobilizing tribal groups either to assert the group's 
autonomy, to resist assimilation or to define conflicting 
language loyalties. 
Numerous languages are also seen as a barrier to 
communication between individuals as well as among groups. 
The component parts of a multilingual country have the 
disadvantage of not understanding each other because they 
do not speak the same language. Similarly, the substance 
of communication can be potentially distorted due to 
different interpretations by different linguistic groups. 
^T, R. H. Davenport, op. cit., p. 19?. 
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This would produce inconsistent reaction from the popula- 
tion. 
Shall we therefore assume that stable and unified 
European nations are so because they are not multi-lingual? 
The answer is obviously no. Every nation needs a lingua- 
franca, a commonly shared languag;e at least at the func- 
tional level. While some European nations aire multi- 
lingual, they also possess a general language. But, the 
majority of post-colonial African states do not have a 
literary native language that is universally shared. 
Whatever exists as a functional language has been one 
that came with colonialism. Moreover, such foreign lan- 
guages are only spoken and written by the educated few? 
the majority of the people depend on their native tongues 
for communication. Without going any further, the argu- 
ment of ethnolinquistic school is valid to some extent. 
However, it is too narrow an approach to explain a pheno- 
menon as total as disunity. 
It is appropriate to summarize the views of the three 
schools we have discussed. What they have done collec- 
tively is to draw our attention to the problems that 
heterogeneous structures - tribal groups, cultural entities 
and linguistic units - have posed for national unity. The 
prevalence of these plural structures is a fact of twen- 
tieth century Third World and, it is apparent that 
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individually and collectively, these phenomena are the 
overriding social forces. They represent in a phrase, 
^concrete patterns of primordial diversity** and are 
believed to have overpowering meaning for the individual 
whose sense of self remains bound up in the gross actuali- 
ties of blood, language, kinship, locality, religion and 
traditiono 
Primordially based solidarities have a deeply 
abiding strength among the people. The individual may 
be living in the city or in the rural area, he may be a 
wage worker or a peasant but his primordial affiliations 
remain paramount. Instability is the result of the actions 
and reactions of these forces. Writes Geertzs 
To subordinate these specific and familiar 
identifications in favour of a generalized 
commitment to an over arching and somewhat 
alien civil order is to risk a loss of de- 
finition as an autonomous person, either 
through absorption into a culturally un- 
differentiated mass or, what is even worse 
through domination by some other rival, 
ethnic (tribal), racial or linguistic com- 
munity that is able to imbue that order 
with the temper of its own personality.! 
It is therefore the longing not to belong to any other 
group, not to speak any other group's language and not 
to adopt the culture of another group that become ex- 
*This phrase is borrowed from GeertZc See his article 
in Geertz ed. Old Societies and New States. The Free 
Press, New York7 T967. 
pp. 108-109. 
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pressed in political instability. The feeling one gets 
from this conglomeration of factors is that the problem 
of unity has a wide scope. The problem is total and some- 
what all embracing and extends far beyond the concerns of 
these social scholars. Therefore, we must proceed to 
explore the political perspectives in our search for fur- 
ther knowledge. 
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVESs 
To be discussed in this category are 1) the political 
school and 2) the Marxist explanation. The first school 
looks at the state apparatus and the second looks at the 
social class basis of the state. 
4) Political Schools Lofchie and Turner belong to this 
school of explanation.* Their interest is to examine the 
structure of the state apparatus of the ex-colonial coun- 
tries, Their aim is to determine the effectiveness with 
which the state machinery fulfills its principal function 
- regulation of society. As one scholar has noted, the 
states of Third World Countries lack coherence, that is, 
they have "not become separate from, dominant over, or 
capable of regulating society".! This is true, both of 
'* ^ ^ ^ . 
Lofchie, M, "Political Constraints on African Develop- 
ment", in Michael Lofchie (ed.). The State of Nations; 
Constraints on Development in Independent Africa. 
Berkeley University of California Press, 1971, Turner, 
Teresa. "Multinational Corporations and the Instability 
of the Nigerian State" , in the Review of African Politi- 
cal Economy, #5, 19?6. 
1 Turner, Teresa, op. cit, , p. 63. 
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the organs of government such as political parties and 
legislatures as well as the bureaucracy - all of which are 
ridden with corruption and nepotism* The political school 
has argued that in spite of the central importance of the 
state as an institution that monopolizes authority in 
Western Societies, Third World States are basically fra- 
gile and vulnerable* As a result, they are unable to 
systematically integrate fragmented and divided societies 
into a unified, coherent whole, capable of self- 
identif ication * 
If these states were able to legitimize themselves, 
to have the underlying diffuse confidence of their popu- 
lations, obviously the states would not be subjected to 
series of violent military coups as has been the case in 
most of those countries. These coups occur because the 
state has been turned into a centre for factional power 
struggles. This is more so since we can easily point to 
the absence of military coups among the developed countries 
of Europe where the state power is widely and firmly en- 
trenched* However, in making such judgements, we must be 
aware of some peculiarities. Third World States are still 
in their forma.tive period and they have assumed greater 
and more complex roles. They are concerned with develop- 
ment , the generation of economic growth and with the 
alleviation of hardship created by social change. These 
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roles contrast dramatically with the role played by 
European States during their formative era* Economic 
development was not a state function but that of an 
autonomous entrepreneural class outside the state. This 
means that the political burden on state institutions 
was considerably lighter. By and large, the social 
problems created by the greater involvement of Third 
World States imply more burden than the institutions can 
handle. Under these circumstances, Third World States are 
bound to be weak and fragile. For Wallerstein, "as long 
as the state machinery remains fragile..., there will be 
chronic instability".^ Therefore, the only option seems 
to be to take the path that European states had followed 
namely, the creation of distinct classes. 
5) Marxist School of Explanation: As an integral part 
of the political school, Marxists as reflected in the 
works of Bienen and Anise* are concerned with the social 
class aspect of Third World States. They posit that a 
definite class stratification plays a fundamental role in 
^Wallerstein*s essay "The Range of Choice" in Michael 
Lofchie (ed-). The State of Nations; Constraints on 
Development in Independent Africa^ University of 
California, Berkeley, 1971, P* 33« 
•jj* 
Bienen, Henry. "Political Parties and Political Machines 
in Africa", in Michael Lofchie (ed.) Ibid. And, Anise, 
Ladun. "Ethnicity and National Integration in West 
Africa; Some Theoretical Considerations in Raymond Hall 
(ed.). Ethnic Autonomy. New Yorks Pergamon Press, 1979* 
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every society. It creates an environment for motivation 
as individuals aspire for upward mobility. But, in parti- 
cular, it provides an entrepreneural class for promoting 
economic development. Besides that a stratification 
system fulfills a political function as well. It caja 
fuel a nationalist political class with vested interest 
in the state. Some nationalisms have been a function of 
an elite class consolidating state power, thus ensuring 
stability. As Turner has stateds 
A stable state is..one in which authorized 
individuals* make, apply and enforce legal 
imperatives and public policies. 
Marxists believe that the elites of post-colonial states 
lack these attributes. This is correct and is in part 
due to the fact that the existing state elites are a 
legacy of colonialism. As such, they are peculiar and 
contrast with the historical class structure that exist 
in the developed countries. They are peculiar in the roles 
they play in society, as a result of which there exists 
varying degrees of antagonism which undermine their 
cohesiveness as a class. 
The first of the factors that betray this class is 
__ ; 
Implicitly referring to an elite political class. They 
have a. vested interest in the state and make their career 
from holding public positions. 
^Teresa Turner, op. cit., p. 63, 
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the dual roles they perform. They are state elites as 
well as economic entrepreneurs. The state is their prin- 
cipal employer and their partnership* with foreign firms 
(which control the local economy) enables them to play a 
large role as investors and entrepreneurs. Yet in spite 
of their dualism as political and economic elites, they 
are not equipped with the cadre, myths and sentiments 
that would mould them into a solid, identifiable class* 
This is so because their class interest does not trans- 
cend their tribal affiliations. Marxists have argued that 
their lack of a pan-tribal base has undermined their 
effectiveness as a class and hence frailty in the state 
which they control. 
Their division along tribal lines as opposed to an 
inter-tribal base make their control of the state a 
politically charged issue. By controlling the state, the 
elite class has 1) access to political power and social 
status and, 2) access to investment and income augmenting 
opportunities. To have ample access to these spoils or 
prevent deprivation, factions of this class often resort 
to competition with one another. Since their loyalties 
rest with their respective tribal communities where also 
they draw their support, rivalry for control of the ®spoil 
They^ earn huge income from organizing the access of 
multinational firms to local markets and raw materials. 
of state* becomes tribal rivalry. Anise referred to this 
process when he sta.ted that Third World 
"elites in aspiring for power, status, or 
advantages, may adopt tribal symbols and 
rhetoric, ....to mobilize support'll 
Since this support means by and large tribally based sup- 
port which is aimed at eliminating rival tribal group(s), 
the situation sets one tribe against another. In this 
process, tribalism is activated thus exacerbating conflict. 
The effects of elite manipulation of tribal senti- 
ments can go a long way. After gaining their support, 
the elites usually reward the tribal community concerned. 
Such reward can be direct or indirect and can take many 
forms. Preferential treatment of the tribe in matters of 
development projects and revenue allocation being one. 
But, the most fundamental of all is the common practice 
of making tribal origin rather than merit the main quali- 
fication for appointment to office.** The appointment of 
1 Ladun Anise’s article in Raymond Hall ed. Ethnic Auton- 
omy . Perganon Press, Oxford, 1979, P* 338, 
* / \ In a very brilliant article, Teresa Turner (op, cit.) has 
demonstrated how this process led to the fall of Nigeria's 
Military regime in 1975« 1^^ fact, it is a pattern of 
African politics. 
In March, 19^5 it was made public by the council of the 
University of Lagos that the appointment of the Univer- 
sity’s Vice Chancellor, Professor Eni Njoku had been 
terminated. In his place, Dr, S, Biobaku, a Yoruba was 
appointed to replace him. There were no good academic 
grounds for the termination of Dr. Njoku’s appointment and 
this action was actively opposed by the University Senate 
and the majority of both staff and students. See Robin 
Luckham, The Nigerian Militarvs A Sociological Analysis 
of Authority and Revolt 1Q60--67 , Cambridge University 
Press, 1971, p. 217. 
one's tribal followers to fill important positions may 
not be massive but as Bienen has stated, "upward mobility 
for the group as a whole may be perceived, symbolically, 
in having one member rise high"oi This situation is known 
to have produced discontent and often violent reaction 
from other tribes who are excluded from the favour* The 
perversiveness of this service to tribalism largely ex- 
plains the endemic corruption and nepotism of these elites* 
The Marxist School must be acclaimed for its insight 
and powerful argument. To make this argument even stron- 
ger, we can go as far as adding that the termination of 
colonial rule in i960 marked the inheritance by these 
elites, of public positions bearing salaries and allowances 
designed originally for expatriate officials* By the 
general standards of poverty in the country, these salaries 
and allowances are inflated, unrealistic and potentially 
disruptive of social and economic equilibrium* The lucra- 
tive or luxurious entitlements attached to those public 
positions have remained a basic attraction to the elites. 
Efforts to eradicate instability must therefore involve 
re-structuring of the state positions so that its appeals 
may match with local standards of poverty* 
Comparing African elites with those of Latin America, 
^Henry Bienen. "Political Parties and Political Machines 
in Africa" , in Michael Lpfchie., The State of Nations^ 
University of California, 1971, page 203* 
one finds that in many of the latter coimtries, a few 
families who own a substantial portion of national re- 
sources . also own and run the stateo In these countries 
also the gap between the few privileged families and the 
mass of the population is very wide» If these countries 
have remained relatively stable and united, why can’t 
African States where the gap is narrower have peace. Per- 
haps the question can be explained by stating that African 
societies do not have distinctive class lines as do their 
Latin American counterpart. 
Both the Marxist and the political school have re- 
vealed how tribalism is reinforced and perpetuateds on 
the one hand by the incapacity of the state to legitimize 
itself (political school); and on the other, by the pecu- 
liar role of the political class. Both the fragility and 
frailty in authority betray the nations it is of some 
benefit to the people to divert their loyalties and ex- 
pectations to other social forms namely, their tribal 
groups. Consequently, tribal identification is perpetuated, 
DIFFUSIONIST PERSPECTIVESs 
In this final category, we shall discuss tv/o schools 
of thoughts Modernization School and Dependency tradi- 
tion. The first looks at the effects on Third World 
societies of their imitation of the European path to 
development; the second school addresses the disadvantages 
4^ 
of the Third World^s peripherial position in the world 
economy. 
6) Modernization School; Among the figures in this school 
are Mazrui and Emerson? They posit that political problems 
in the New States are the result of their imitation of 
European path to development.** It is argued that the 
foundations of a modern society are being laid alongside 
a structure of traditional society which has not lost its 
vitality. Hence, two types of societies are generally 
seen to exist in Third World countries! the modern sec- 
tor and the traditional sector. The modern sector is 
composed of urban centres populated by the educated and 
skilled who are either working for wages and salaries or 
are engaged in modern trades and occupations. Their liv- 
ing is organized around a money market economy, modern 
facilities such as shopping centres, rented housing, 
electricity and pipe-borne water supply. Often serving 
* 
Mazrui, Ali. Violence and Thoughts Essays on Social 
Tensions in Africa. London: Longman* s, 19^9• Emerson, 
Rupert. "The Prospects for Democracy in Africa", in 
Micha.el Lofchie (ed.), op. cit. 
Modernization or development is a preoccupation of most 
of the Third World Governments. In broad terms, this 
means social and economic development. In the social 
sphere, it means reduction or elimination of inequalities 
and a widening of popular access to government sex*vices 
for health, education, and welfare; and in the economic 
arena, it refers to steady improvement of the material 
conditions of life, agricultural diversification, the 
promotion of an industrial capacity, and a generally 
heightened level of self-sufficiency. 
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as bureaucratic centres, the population of these urban 
areas is individualistic in outlook as they seem to be 
considerably submerged in European values. The modern 
sector as a whole is a minority sector and the above 
characteristics distinguish it from the largely tradition- 
al sector of the countries.* 
The traditional sector on the other hand is mainly 
rural and populated by peasants still engaged in sub- 
sistence economic activity. They are geographically and 
socially isolated from the modern sector. Largely poor 
and homogeneous in their class outlook, they have no modern 
facilities as do the modern sector. Here traditional 
institutions, values and beliefs prevail. They are un- 
educated , unskilled and wage employment is almost non- 
existent. These qualities distinguish the traditional 
sector from its modern counterpart. In fact, the notion 
of a 'society within a society® is often used to describe 
the existence side by side of these two societies. Writes 
Emerson the 
’’most grievous cleavage that exists in 
African societies is that which divides 
the Western-trained evolve from those 
who have remained more closely attached 
to the traditional communities."! 
Here we are confronted with one of many controversies in 
academics. The modernization school stands firmly behind 
the dual society hypothesis. And, as we shall see, the 
dependency school rejects this hypothesis in favour of 
a monolithic view of post-colonial societies. 
1 Rupert Emerson, ibid, p. 248. 
What are the conseq^uences of this cleavage? 
It seems as though modernization functions primarily 
in heightening tensions and conflicts«» This is more so 
considering that modernization means largely the destruc- 
tion or erosion of the traditional sectors the disrup- 
tion of family and community life* This is particularly 
noticeable in the high rate of migration from the 
traditional rural areas to the urban centres» This exodus 
is caused by rising expectations which is due to the 
impact of European values. This situtation has brought 
about 'marginalization* of a good proportion of the people. 
Caught in between the two sectors and faced with fr*ustrat- 
ed expectations, they often become the source of social 
unrest. 
But, larger problems loom between the modern and 
traditional sectors. The authorities in the former sector 
are usually bureaucrats and in the latter are traditional 
chiefs. Conflicts between authorities in both sectors 
sometimes arise and they centre on matters of loyalty. 
The inhabitants of the modern sector are loyal to the 
bureaucracy and those in the traditional sector have re- 
mained loyal to their tribal community government. When 
the modern authorities tiy to impose their authority on 
the rural area, either by way of taxation or by legisla- 
tion, they come in conflict with the tribal chief who 
^7 
resists encroachment on his supposed jurisdiction** Such 
competing loyalties between the Buganda tribe and the 
Ugandan government led to the political fragmentation of 
the country’s first republic.^ 
There is no simple solution to this sectoral division 
of society* No process of resbcialization or revolution- 
ary transformation would overnight change the dual 
structure of these societies* Kimble has reminded us that 
"it takes more than a tradition of gradual change to pre- 
pare the Stone Age rain forest dwellers for the arrival 
overnight of the Iron Age, the Air Age and the Electronic 
Age, aind the social furnishings that come with them”*^ 
Therefore, conflicts between the modern and traditional 
sectors will exist for as long as these divisions remain. 
7) Dependency School; Adherents** of this school of 
thought assert that political upheavals in today’s Third 
World are not due to the persistence of any original state 
of affairs. Rather, this condition is the product of 
a structure of dependence. Accordingly, the Third 
World countries are kept in their subordinate place by 
For more on this issue, I refer the reader to Ethnicity 
and National Integration in West Africa by Immanuel Waller- 
stein, (Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines, 3“1, October, 19^0). 
^Mazrui, Ali, Op* cit. , pp* 158-162. 
^Kimble, Op. cit*, p. 
Frank, Andre Gunder. "The Development of Underdevelop- 
ment" , and, "Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment 
of Sociology", in A. G. Frank. Latin Americas Underdevel- 
opment or Revolution. New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1969. Wallerstein, Immanuel (ed«) World Inequality: 
Origins and Perspectives. Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1975* 
means of endemic balance of payments problems arising 
from their trade, aid and investment relationships with 
the imperialist countrieso The dependency school attempts 
to analyze the extent to which Third World countries have 
been economically subjected to the developed countries 
and the effects of this subordinate status on socio- 
political stabilityo It is argued that the economic 
position of these countries has remained essentially in 
the control and service of the metropolitan countries*^ 
Third World countries are basically primary produce ex- 
porters j exporters of agricultural raw materials to the 
developed countrieso In addition, they are consumers of 
manufactured goods imported from the developed countries* 
This trade relationship is seen to benefit the already 
developed countries to the disadvantage of the undeveloped 
ones - a situation known theoretically as ’underdevelop- 
ment* , The implication of underdevelopment of the Third 
World is that it creates a perenial shortage of govern- 
ment revenue and a growing gap between revenue and expen- 
diture thus creating larger and larger budgetary deficits. 
This situation contributes to instability in a multi- 
tribal, multi-cash crops society. 
Where there is tribal specialization in cash crop 
production, that is, in a country where tribe A produces 
1 ^ ■ ... 
See Bloch in Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 1970, cited 
in M. Klare, War Without End. New Yorks 1972, p. 13. 
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cocoa, tribe B produces palm oil and, tribe G exports 
groundnuts (conforming with the differential territorial 
basis of the tribes), "the national impact of cash crop 
farmers” v/ill occur "in tribal terms'’#^ The state-owned 
marketing boards organize and market the exports on behalf 
of the farmers. But the marketing boards do not control 
the unpredictable market conditions of the crops; fluc- 
tuations in demand and price. Conseq.uently, a fall in 
the demand and price of cocoa reduces the incomes and 
profits of tribe A whose entire economic well-being depends 
on cocoa. The tendency of tribe A to blame its hardship 
on the marketing board and hence, the state is high. 
The tribe directs its discontent to the state because in 
its view, the state is responsible for the. economic diffi- 
culties. Such complaints about the state are, in a sense, 
directed at the governing party. Since the governing 
party is likely to be dominated by another tribe, such 
"complaints ...are transformed into complaints about the 
ethnic (tribal) group presumably in power".2 This process 
can be repeated many times depending on which cash crop 
is the victim of fluctuating market conditions. In this 
way, economic grievances arising from the dependent status 
^Bienen, "Prospects for democracy in Africa", in Lofchie 
op. cit., p. 199. 
2 Wallerstein, Ethnicity and National Integration in West 
Africa, p. 137* 
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of Third World countries are transformed into political 
instability. 
To counter this challenge to stability, some govern- 
ments have adopted price stabilization policies by which 
they 1) buy from farmers, any surpluses that might arise 
from reduced world demand- They are stored and marketed 
during scarcity. 2) The setting up of a special fund has 
made it possible for some governments to pay a fixed price 
to farmers thus eliminating fluctuations- These approaches 
have so far been successful in reducing friction. We 
must conclude by acknowledging the contribution of the 
dependency school to our knowledge of the sources of con- 
flict in the Third World- 
CONCLUSION 
The three groups of perspectives already discussed 
have presented us with alternative explanations of the 
sources of disunity in the Third World- The emphasis, 
of course, varies according to the phenomena studied. 
Thus, the social perspectives and their explicit concern 
with primordial strutures emphasize phenomena ranging 
from multiplicity of tribal groups and cultural- 
pluralism, to the diversity of languages- Using these 
phenomena as their basis of argument, they have shown 
how these are ill-adapted to modern conditions. Thereby, 
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these scholars take an implicit stance that the primordial 
heterogeneous structures are naturally inconducive to 
stability and unity. To refute this argument, we have 
drawn upon world-wide examples to show that the conclusion 
is wrong. 
What the social perspectives seem to have forgotten 
or left out is the fact that it is not the presence of 
heterogeneous structures (whether these be of groups, of 
cultures or of languages) per se that aids in conflicts. 
But rather, it is the uses to which these structures are 
put. Heterogeneous structures can be skillfully managed 
in which case stability and unity can result. But when 
this situation is exploited, all we can expect is conflict 
and instability. 
The political perspectives on the other hand are 
noted for their overt concern with the structure and basis 
of the state. The writers have shown the biases associat- 
ed with their discipline. The theme of their argument is 
that Third World states are doomed: on the one hand, the 
states do not have authoritative apparatuses to govern and 
to win the loyalty and confidence of their subjects; and, 
on the other, the absence of a solid class of elites who 
have vested interests in the state helps to explain its 
fragility. It is in the making of these situations that 
the political perspectives locate conflict in the Third 
52 
World countries. This argument is convincing to some ex- 
tent. However, it does not exhaust the range of explana- 
tions. 
The diffusionist perspectives as reflected in the 
thoughts of modernization school and the dependency approach 
can he said to have arisen out of the world-wide expansion 
of capitalism through colonialism. Their emphasis vary 
from the impact of modern values and institutions on the 
traditional structure to the subjection of the Third World 
societies to the economic dictates of the developed coun- 
tries o All of these are seen to have a contrihutive 
effect on conflict. 
However, it is the view of this writer that these 
schools of explanation have not addressed all the attri- 
hutes of disunity in the Third World. In particular, they 
have failed to address a core aspect of the histories of 
these countries and of the study of disunity. Their 
major common weakness is their orientation toward tribal- 
ism whereby conflict is explained only in terms of or in 
relation to the tribal structure.* The second weakness 
is that these schools have prudently shied away from a 
¥ 
Conflict, according to the social perspectives is the 
direct result of the complex traditional structure. 
Political perspectives locate conflict in the inter- 
action between this complex structure and the state and 
Diffusionist perspectives explain conflict in terms of 
the reaction of the traditional structure to elements 
diffused from the West. 
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systematic treatment of the colonial situation» We cannot 
ignore the central importance of colonial policy and the 
method of its administration in shaping socio-political 
life in the now ex-colonieso 
In our viev/ the impact of colonial government policy 
can he traced throughout the three perspectives surveyed 
above a It is deemed here that the structures of hetero- 
geneity were put to ill uses during colonial rule* 
Secondly, it can he proven that the basis and structure 
of the state were designed to remain fragile and vulnerable 
even after the withdrawal of colonial rule. Therefore, 
it becomes necessary that disunity in Nigeria be studied 
in terms of the effects of colonial policy and the method 
of its administration. Our analysis shall be confined to 
the single most important development in Nigeria's colon- 
ial history namely, amalgamation and the accompanying 
indirect rule policy. Only by so doing can we understand 
the contribution of colonialism to national disunity. 
5^ 
CHAPTER III 
THE AMALGAMATION OF NORTHERN 
AND SOUTHERN NIGERIA 
In this chapter we shall show that until 191^ 
Northern and Southern Nigeria were administered as separ- 
ate territories. During this period colonial administra- 
tions in each of the territories pursued different 
policies: indirect rule in the North and direct rule in 
the South. Then we proceed to analyze the effects of 
these policies on each of the two territories: one became 
modernized and another remained traditional. This leads 
us to analyze the anatomy of amalgamation. This raises 
issues at three levels of generality: first, what were 
the reasons behind amalgamation? How have cleavages be- 
tween the North and the South been created and maintained? 
Finally, how have such cleavages been related to the 
effects of the policies of indirect rule in the North and 
direct rule in the South. 
1. DIRECT RULE IN SOUTHERN NIGERIA 
The form of government that the colonialists adopted 
in any colonial territory depended largely on whether the 
colony was to become a permanent colonial settlement or 
a non-settler one. Both Northern and Southern Nigeria 
belonged to the latter category. However, being non- 
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settler colonies does not mean that they shared in common 
methods of colonial administration. In fact, the two 
territories were subjected to profoundly different and 
contradictory policies. Indirect administration policy 
was pursued in the North and we shall return to a detailed 
discussion of this policy. In territories where indirect 
rule was not practiced namely, the colonies of Australia, 
Canada, Ghana and of course, Southern Nigeria, the colon- 
ialists established instead, the policy of direct rule. 
The aim of this policy was not to recognize native insti- 
tutions and rule the people through same, but to extend 
as far as possible, British institutions of government, 
of law and order as well as justice. Under direct rule 
policy, administration was organized on the basis of 
British county councils. Thus, native councils were 
created everywhere in Southern Nigeria. Legislative 
councils were also set up in which officials and nominated 
unofficials participated. The introduction of such 
British institutions into Southern Nigeria facilitated 
the spread of British values and norms. 
The direct policy of administration may have seemed 
desirable to the colonialists because of their confidence 
in British civilization of the time. It may also have 
been the choice because of their lack of understanding 
of native society, its institutions and how it worked for 
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the peopleo Whatever the reasons behind the adoption of 
this policy, one thing that is clear is that its applica- 
tion in Southern Nigeria was not a mistake*. For the 
natives, it was a method of government that made good use 
of their values and aspirationso And, for those gifted 
colonial administrators,^ the direct system of rule re- 
presented a commitment to integrate the natives on the 
British model and to raise them up in progress. This 
commitment seemed to have been in the minds of every 
successive administrator in Southern Nigeria between I9OO 
and 191^* From the time the British protectorate was 
declared over Southern Nigeria in I900, Lugard notes that 
A native Councils Ordinance was enacted and 
Councils were set up from, one end of the 
protectorate to the other, over which Govern- 
ment officials exercised a supervision which 
was not merely nominal, and the natives 
acquiesced to this exercise of jurisdiction 
by the Crown.2 
The Councils were composed of ten government officials, 
three Europeans representing commercial and missionary 
interests and three Africans of non-offical status. 
Though the composition of the Council did not quite favour 
^Prominent among them are Sir Ralph Moor (1900-190^) and 
Sir Walter Egerton (190^-1912). For a complete list of 
British Governors in Nigeria, see Michael Crowder, The 
Story of Nigeria. London: Faber and Faber, 1978, p. 288. 
2 Lugard, Lord, Report on the Amalgamation of Northern 
^d Southern Nigeria, 1912-1919- Great Britain, Cmd 
1920, p. 12*. 
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Nigerians vis-a-vis the aJLiens, it nevertheless represents 
preparation for modern democratic government. By pulling 
together the interests of the Natives, the church, commerce 
and government, the method allowed administration to pro- 
ceed on a sound basis. The combination of these varied 
interests combined with sound policy and method of admin- 
istration, made Southern Nigeria a land of prosperous 
opportunities. British and German traders and missionary 
pioneers were continually attracted to foster influence 
in the direction of material development, evangelization 
and of education. 
The activities of missionaries, commercialists and 
administrators combined to bring about rapid innovations 
that drastically changed the character of southern society. 
The development of import-export trade with Europe created 
opportunities in farming, trade and in service industry 
into which Nigerians quickly moved. With increase in 
opportunities and wealth, came the rise of a new class 
of native businessmen and traders whose interests were 
vested in the capitalist economy. At the same time, 
missionaries were pioneering educational development. 
Missionary schools were established everywhere providing 
the natives with education. Here the pioneering work of 
the Church Missionary Society (G.M.S.) remains a landmark, 
Mr, de Graft of the C.M.S. first opened a day school in 
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18^5, which he called the "Nursery of the Infant Church". 
Later in 1859, the C.M.S. Crammer School was opened and 
was followed in I878 hy the opening of the Methodist Boy’s 
High School, Lagos. These schools taught the basic 
educational staple of reading, writing and arithmetic, 
with a few extras such as history and geography. A num- 
ber of Southerners emerged from these schools with 
literacy that enabled them to take up jobs in Government, 
Church, and in teaching, etc. As early as I865, two 
Lagosians, S. A. Crowther and Henry Carr had risen to the 
ranks of Bishop and Inspector of Schools respectively.* 
Educational efforts led to the emergence of an educated 
class of clerics, lawyers, teachers and clerks whose 
interest was based mainly on modern bureaucratic and pro- 
fessional occupations. 
On every count, these social and economic changes 
represent a step forward.» These forward steps were thanks 
to the "liberal" policy of the Southern administration 
which permitted unrestricted missionary and commercial 
activities. The foundation of development had been laid 
and progress continued under direct administration policy 
until 191^. 
^ ' 
For more.on educational development in the South, see . 
Otita Nduka, "Colonial Education and Nigerian Society",. 
in Gavin Williams (ed.). Nigeria; Economy and Society. 
Rex Ceilings. London. 1976. And, Lagos Hanbook. Lagos; 
Ministry of information, I898, p. 180. ' 
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II. INDIRECT RULE IN NORTHERN NIGERIA 
In contrast to direct rule is the policy of indirect 
rule. British authorities would make use of native 
agents and to some extent, recognize native laws and 
customs. In such cases, the traditional institutions 
and administrative machinery remain intact and become the 
basis of the new administration. Indirect rule seemed a 
practicable policy in the non-settler areas where the 
native population had achieved some form of hierarchi- 
cal political structure thereby allowing for some use of 
the existing traditional institutions. It was the policy 
pursued in Java (S.E. Asia), in Uganda and in Quebec. 
But it received its most classic expression in Northern 
Nigeria. The system has the advantage of minimizing 
administrative costs both in money and in men. But what- 
ever the advantages might have been, the British are not 
the first conq.uerors in history to adapt the institutions 
of the native to the task of ruling them. The practice 
dates back to the Romans, and the Germans aLso practiced 
it in their African colonies. Suffice to say that Nor- 
thern Nigeria was not the first colonial territory to 
experience indirect rule but it presented a comparatively 
well-established structure for the thriving of the system. 
lAJhat are these distinctive features? 
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Modern sociologists^ have variably described Northern 
Nigerian Society in terms such as autocratic and feudal- 
istic respectively. But, while their descriptions refer 
to specific political and economic modes of organization 
which characterize Northern Society, its broad and general 
description fits Max Weber's concept of patrimonialism.* 
Northern Nigerian Society can thus better be described as 
a patrimonial structure. Whitaker shares the view that 
patrimonialism is a better description because the concept 
is all-embracing and also because it provides a theoreti- 
cal framework for further description. It is important 
to understand the meaning of a patrimonial structure be- 
cause first, in contrast to the South, Northern traditional 
social organization was based on its principles; secondly, 
as we shall see in the next chapter, the adoption of 
indirect rule as uniform government meant the extension 
of patrimonial form of organization to the South. 
Weber's discussion of patrimonial domination ranges 
over several different levels of analysis (household, 
village, region and Nation-State). In this paper, we are 
concerned with the Hausa-Fulani (Northern) state struc- 
^For instance, C. S, Whitaker. The Politics of Tradition. 
Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria. Princeton 
University Press, 1970, PP* 177-259- And, Kirk-Green and 
Hogben, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria. Londons Oxford 
University Press, 1966- 
Max,Weber. Economy and Society. New Yorks Bedminster 
Press, 1968, Volo 3 (edited by Guenther Roth and Claus 
Wittich), 
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ture, rather than the patrimonial domination that may also 
exist at the household, village or regional levels* How- 
ever, in order to fully appreciate Weber's discussion of 
state patrimonialism, it is helpful to have some notion 
of his argument that patrimonialism at the "macro" level 
is a logical reflection of patrimonialism at the "micro" 
) 
level. Discussions of patronage in a village or "patron- 
client bonds" in villages or regions represent attempts 
at understanding patrimonial domination which can be help- 
ful as analogies in the discussion of patrimonialism at 
the nation-state level, or, in earlier times, the state 
level. 
There is a logical connection between Weber's state 
patrimonialism and the structure of the Hausa-Fulani 
Society in the sense that both are based on the princi- 
ples of domination and dependence. The dependency rela- 
tionship in each case, writes Weber is based on loyalty 
and fealty. The fidelity is not purely one-sided and is 
held together by norms of reciprocity.^ In this fashion, 
the rulers of the Hausa-Fulani State known by titles as 
"Sultan" and "Emir", cannot exploit their subjects without 
risking the loss of their status and legitimacy. The 
^Max Weber op. cit., pp. 1013-1014. It should be added 
that the Inca State and Jesuit State in Paraguay were 
based on similar lines of loyalty and fealty. 
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rulers are not bound in any formal "rational-legal" way 
but they are held in check to a certain extent neverthe- 
less® While the ruler may be an absolute despot in some 
respect (e.g® Sultanism), his power of life and death in 
particular decisions such as punishment of theft is not 
matched by an absolute power over the community as a 
whole® His dependents are too well aware of the thin line 
which separates him from them to allow acts which by 
tradition, are considered exploitative® In this respect, 
the Hausa-Fulani patrimonial state is not as "civilized"* 
as historic bureaucratic empires including Tang China, 
New Kingdom Egypt, where the ruler is much more distant 
from the community and much less like the patriarch of a 
household® However, discussion of Hausa-Fulani Society 
is incomplete without mentioning the role of Islam® 
Islam is the religion of the Hausa-Fulani, Its 
influence on Hausa-Fulani Society is so all-pervasive that 
some authors* are led to believe that it is the main force 
regulating the society. Social cohesion is not so much 
the result of the effectiveness of the rulers but is the 
function of the society's adherence to Islamic precepts. 
Complicated by the pervasiveness of Islam, the structure 
of Hausa-Fulani State remains, to many, including Lord 
*Nicolson, I. F. Administration of Nigeria. I900-I960, 
Oxfords Clarendon Press, I969; and, John Hatch, Nigeria, 
the Seeds of Disaster. Chicagos Henry Regnery, 1970* 
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Lugard, a distinctive hierarchical structureo We can 
summarize the important features of the Hausa-Fulani 
Society as follows 5 
1) One ruler (the Sultan) retains political, domination 
over the Emirs and he is the master of the patrimonial 
state and no one can effectively oppose him. 
2) Subjects are required to render military service, 
customary la.bour services, honorary gifts, support in 
special circumstances, and so forth. 
3) All land is nominally owned by the ruler, and 
4) The ruler is a political head as well as a religious 
leader from whom both secular and divine powers flow. 
All these factors combine to produce a kind of social 
solidarity in Hausa-Fulani land that is unparalled any- 
where else in Nigeria.* 
Such was the system which Lugard admired and which 
he effectively incorporated under his control. When 
Whitaker, 1970? Nicolson, 19^9» and Heussler, 19^8; have 
argued that the Hausa-Fulani patrimonial rule was on the 
verge of incipient internal decay when Colonial Rule was 
established in 1900. He says that Emirs and their es- 
tates were revolting against the overall authority of 
the Sultan and that Lugard saved the structure by en- 
couraging traditionalism by way of reviving Islamic 
traditions. The reasons for the internal decay is irre- 
levant here but what is clear is that Lugard did attempt 
to revive Islamic religion and hence Islamic law which 
emphasizes respect for authority. Lugard may have done 
this as a justification for his own authority as well. 
We shall return to this issue. Whitaker op. cit.j 
Nicolson op. cit.j and Robert Heussler. The British in 
Northern Nigeria. London: Oxford University I^ess,1968. 
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Colonial Rule was esta^blished in 1900, there was only one 
ruler who held power over all others: Lord Lugard, the 
High Commissioner, Beginning in 1900, Lugard successfully 
established indirect rule over the Hausa-Fulani, with a 
pledge that "the religion of the people (Islam) would not 
he interfered with."^ Not only is it normal under in- 
direct rule to recognize the native institutions of the 
Hausa-Fulani but Lugard realized that Islam was the source 
of law and of political authority, as well as holding 
sway over economic, social and cultural life. Remaining 
bound to his pledge of non-interference, Lugard spotted 
potential subversive influences and immediately formulated 
policies designed to protect the Islamic Society, Among 
the measures taken are the "barring of Christian missions 
from the North" and the restrictive permission given to 
European commercial firms.^ Nicolson3 has attributed 
the poverty of the North to these prohibitive measures. 
He argues that had Lugard permitted commercial enterprises 
and missionary activity in the North as was done in the 
South, the North would have been developed both materially 
and educationally, thus creating ample sources of revenue. 
This would have made the North financially self-sufficient, 
^Whitaker, op, cit,, p, 269. 
^Ibid., p. 30. 
%icolson, op. cit., pp. 124-179* 
But since this was not the case, the North had to depend 
on a "grant-in-aid” from the imperial government to finance 
its administration. It can also he argued that the need 
to amalgamate the North and South would not have occurred 
since the reason for amalgamation was to relieve the 
imperial government of the burden of financing Northern 
administration. However, the fact remains that Northern 
people were encouraged to resist external influences 
whether upon their religion, dress, architecture, or way 
of life generally, thus preventing modernization. 
Lugard*s strong conviction that any action that 
weakened the authority of the Muslim religion would also 
weaken the authority and prestige of the rulers, and would 
thus imperil the system of indirect administration, prompt- 
ed him to encourage consolidation of the authority of the 
Emirs and of the religion of Islam, Efficiency and 
stability tended to be the operative criteria within the 
colonial administration evaluated an Emir's performance. 
This rating was accompanied by the practice of rewarding 
supporters and punishing opponents. As the Emirs soon 
learned that in the last analysis it was the British 
Governor who controlled administrative functions, they 
naturally responded to this situation by cultivating the 
support of the administration through exhibition of the 
qualities most immediately likely to impress and endear. 
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Having won British support, the Emir then faced his Coun- 
cillors and his people with the additional, indeed, 
crucial backing of British authority® This is the pheno- 
menon that Himmelstrand refers to in his essay on tribal- 
ism in which he tells us thats 
»,*the British Colonial administration had 
the effect of increasing the power of the 
Sultans and Emirs by introducing what is 
generally known as indirect rule-i 
The Sultans and Emirs were made part of the Colonial ad- 
ministration, and in this way managed to maintain and even 
strengthen their positions in most cases® As their 
domination gained momentum, the rulers became increasing- 
ly insulated from their subjects and in this way 
intensified their dependence. 
Fearing that the growing power of the Hausa-Fulani 
rulers over their subjects might lead to internal decay 
of the system of Indirect Rule, the administration made 
an appeal to Islam® Ancient Islamic traditions were re- 
vived in the name of religious purification and reform, 
with excessive emphasis placed on Islam as "a religion 
of obedience”, This was part of a wider campaign to 
strengthen conservatism among Hausa-Fulani rulers and 
to ensure the continued submission of the people® It 
^Himmelstrand, Ulf. "Tribalism, Regionalism, National- 
ism and Secession in Nigeria" in Eisenstadt and Rokkan 
(edSo)o Building Nations and States. Beverly Hills: 
Sage Publications, 1973, P- ^3^. 
6? 
seems to have been a general imperial strategy when we 
recall that in the years following the conquest of Quebec, 
the British encouraged conservatism among the main forces 
in French Canadian society including the Catholic Church, 
Carl Wittke^ tells us in his history of Canada (19^1) that 
Conservative Catholic priests were imported from France 
to man the French Canadian Church, If this was a general 
colonial tactic designed to increase British influence 
while preventing possible unrest (which it obviously was), 
they carried it to perfection in Northern Nigeria, 
Coloniail educational policy in Northern Nigeria saw 
fit to establish Islamic Schools in which the subjects 
taught were some Arabic and Islamic law. In a society 
where the religious code is also the Code of Law, it is 
only natural that Islamic instruction constitutes legal 
instruction as well. However, a feature of the system 
was the importation of Islamic fundamentalists from Sudan 
in North Africa to man these schools - something anala- 
gous to the importation of Catholic fundamentalists from 
France to Quebec. Here the Sudanese Islamic teachers re- 
interpreted the Koran (Islamic Holy Bible) and csime up 
with a new set of codes on which Whitaker has commented; 
The codes were deliberately modeled on the 
corresponding laws in the former British 
Wittke, Carl. A History of Canada, Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart, 
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Sudan, on the grounds that. o,. they had 
already been modified to fit special needs 
in that predominantly Islamic and African 
countiy and therefore were particularly 
suited to Northern Nigeria.i 
The object of these new instructions was to inculcate 
traditional Islamic respect for authority. The Emirs’ 
secular power continued to be augmented by appeals to the 
ideals of Islam which combine temporal and religious 
authority in the person of the ruler. In standing be- 
hind indigeneous authority in this fashion, the British 
authority naturally reinforced the people’s estimate of 
their rulers’ coercive potential, and justifiably so in 
light of the refinements in organization and technology 
which the British might bring to bear. Lugard firmly 
established his method of indirect rule in the North, and 
it grew strong in consolidation and powerful in the in- 
fluence of the rulers over their subjects — a situation 
that led one of the colonial officials to remark that 
By the time Lugard left Northern Nigeria, 
he had constructed both upon paper and 
in the practice of men, British and Afri- 
can, who worked under him, what can claim 
to be the most comprehensive, coherent 
and renowned system of administration in 
our colonial history.2 
This was the situation of colonial rule in Northern Niger- 
ia until the year 191^ when Lugard plunged indirect rule 
^Whitaker, op. cit., p. 225 
2 
Perham, Margery. Lugard.s The Years of Authority, page 
138. 
into a crisiso The crisis started in 191^ when Lugard 
was entrusted with the task of amalgamating Nigeria and 
he decided to extend indirect rule to the South, to ma^e 
it a universal form of rule for the amalgamated Nigeria* 
Indirect administration in the North and direct 
administration in the South produced incompatible differ- 
ences between the two regions. The South acquired modern 
institutions and values and the North was moulded in the 
direction of traditional conservatism, thus accentuating 
the already existing differences of race, religion and 
culture• 
"This divergence", writes Lord Lugard, "was 
in part due to deliberate differences of 
administrative method and organization, . 
and in part, due to the earlier history of 
each Government and the circumstances which 
had moulded its development under British 
rule. . • o 
The earlier history of each government and the circum- 
stances which moulded them emanate from the belief of 
each administration in the superiority of its policy and 
method. This belief which was often expressed in overt 
rivalry over matters of common interests, (as epitomized 
in the railway dispute of I906 discussed earlier), obvious- 
ly point to the fact that the two types of government were 
adopted as viable and permanent forms of rule. This 
further means the methods reflected the needs, values and 
i ^ — V 
Lugard, Amalgamation Report ^ p. 12. 
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characi:eris*bics of the people of each region. Later on 
in 1914, the differences in race, religion and culture and, 
most particularly, the direct administrative method of 
the South, its earlier history and the circumstances 
which moulded its development were ignored. 
The man who was to ignore the primordial differences 
between Northern and Southern Nigeria and, particularly, 
how the effects of colonial rule might widen these differ- 
ences was Lord Lugard. For many years between 1894 and 
1919 Lugard was the chief colonial architect in Nigeria. 
His outstanding service in the North made him the "king- 
pin" of British colonial empire. Therefore, it was not 
an accident that Lugard was entrusted with the task of 
amalgamating Northern and Southern Nigeria. Whether or 
not Lugard performed this task in the right manner does 
not matter presently but Sir Charles Jeffries has told 
us that "By general consent, the title of the maker of 
modern Nigeria belongs to Lord Lugard."^ 
In the absence of direct administration of Nigeria 
by the Colonial Office, Lugard was the man whose decisions, 
preferences and interests shaped almost the entire life 
^JeffriesSir Charles. The Colonial Office. George Allen 
and Unwin, London, 195^» P« • There is an excellent 
chronology of Lugard*s life including his early private 
life in Nigeria before becoming a public figure in Perham, 
Margery and Mary Bull, (eds.). The Diaries of Lord 
Lugard, Feber, London, I963. 
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of the country: 
The executive powers of the Crown in the 
territory (Nigeria) are invested in him 
(Lugard)o Except in certain specific 
matters such as the granting of honours and 
the power of assenting to legislation on 
matters reserved for the Sovereign* s per- 
sonal pleasure, he (Lugard) exercised all 
the constitutional functions of the Crown 
within the territory including the Royal 
prerogative of mercy 
In 1900-1906, Lugard was High Commissioner in Northern 
Nigeriai in 1912-1913, He was Governor of Northern and 
Southern Nigeria; and in 191^“1919, Lugaxd was Governor- 
General of Nigeria® During these years, Lugard exercised 
all the constitutional functions including the amalgama- 
tion of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 191^« It 
represents his most important constituional function in 
which the continuity of Nigeria's past with the present 
has been brought more sharply into focus® This develop- 
ment is highly crucial to our analysis and shall presently 
be dealt with to delineate the issues and problems of 
unity in Nigeria. 
Ill AMALGAMATION 
In the first part of this chapter we stressed the 
point that indirect rule in the North and direct rule in 
the South are diametrically opposed policies® We also 
showed the differential effects of these policies on the 
North and the South. Finally, we showed that the effects 
^Lugard, Amalgamation Report, p. 35 
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of these policies further intensified the differences be- 
tween the North and the Southo In conclusion, we argued 
that the policies of indirect rule and direct rule were 
not intended to prepare the North and the South for future 
union as a single country. Therefore, the present writer 
contends that the need for amalgamation did not exist. Now, 
we must ask the question, why were the two regions amalga- 
mated? This raises further questionss whose interests 
did amalgamation serve? Mas amalgamation effected in order 
to satisfy the interests of the native population, of Bri- 
tain or of both? Or, could it be that amalgamation was an 
inevitable result of some unexplained circumstances. 
Some attempts have been made to explain the circum- 
stances that precipitated amalgamation. There are those 
who think that Britain was faced with shortage of staff 
for its colonies and decided to overcome the problem by 
amalgamating the two Nigerias.l In this view, amalgama- 
tion pooled the staff of the two protectorates together 
thus reducing the number required to run the protector- 
ates independentlyo Another argument, and presumably the 
most important is that the whole apparatus of colonial 
government in Nigeria including infrastructural develop- 
ment was designed to serve Britain’s economic pursuits. 
“i" 
See for instance, Lindsay Barrett’s review of General 
Alexander Madiebp’s book; "The Nigerian Revolution and 
the Biafran War”, West Africa Magazine No. 3305, Nov. 
24, 1980, p. 2365. He states that amalgamtion was for 
administrative convenience. 
73 
A recent book review on British colonization of Nigeria 
draws attention to Britain's obsession with economic bene- 
fits* Its author states that "The British build roads^ 
railways and harbours to advance their economic inter- 
ests" In their preoccupation with economic exploita-^ 
tion Britain in 191^ "linked the country tenuously together 
with the institutions of the law and order"in order to 
effectively control its vital economic interests* What 
did Britain's economic interests in Nigeria consist of? 
And what was the economic relationship between Britain 
and each of the two Nigerias? How did this economic con- 
dition percipitate the amalgamation of the two protector- 
ates? 
It was common belief that Britain's trade with the 
empire was vital to her national survival and, wherever 
and whenever British government was set up over colonial 
peoples in Asia or Africa, particularly under non- 
settler situation, the pre-occupation of the Governor was 
^Ollawa, P. E, review of. "Democratie and National 
Integration in Nigeria", in Africa Social Research. 
#20, December, 1975, P* 829* 
^IMd. 
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to make the natives concerned pay the costsTaxation 
was the principal method by which natives were made to 
hear the burden of their administrationo So ^ if govern- 
ment was going to stipulate for payment of tax in cash, 
there was only one thing it could do. That is to put 
money into the hands of the natives and then take it back. 
Commodity relations between colony ajid the mother country 
was a typical policy for achieving this objective. The 
Colonial State machine, namely, the good offices of 
Imperial rule was geared toward developing exports to 
European countries. This normally took the form of export 
of agricultural produce and/or minerals. Where there 
were no indigenous produce that was needed in Europe, new 
cash crops were introduced from other continents. Apply- 
ing this policy to Nigeria, Bertram Uba writes: 
Leonard Barnes, in his book: Empire and Democracy, Victor 
Gollantz, London, 1939, tells us (p. 175) that the 
Chancellor of Exchequer in London insisted on that. Two 
other writers are in agreement that the Colonial Office 
did not control the financial operations of colonial 
governments. Though encouraged to be financially self- 
sufficient, a bankrupt colonial government could apply 
to London for financial assistance but the process of 
getting such funds was so arduous and humiliating that 
the method itself was discouraging. As a result, some 
Colonial Governors (e.g« Lugard) resorted to the imposi- 
tion of high taxes in order to maintain the financial 
balance of the Government.. See Nicolson, I. F. : The 
Administration of Nigeria, Oxford, 19^9 and Margery 
Perham: Lugard, The Years of Authority^ Collins, London, 
I96O0 
75 
The British on taking over control of 
Nigeria introduced new cash crops - ground 
nuts, cotton, rubber, cocoa, etc. which 
were cultivated and exported.«. .3^ 
Among the export crops mentioned by Uba, cocoa for example, 
is not indiginous in Nigeria. The crop was introduced 
there from South America. The innovations of export 
economy freguently proved revolutionary to the social as 
well as the traditional economic order of colonial 
peoples. William Woodruff reported that 
"where tribes were reluctant to become 
involved with the European, idea of cash 
crops and market economies, laws were 
enacted obliging each tribal community to 
grow cash crops where produce could be 
marketed.2 
Thus, Colonial peoples were commonly directed what to grow 
and in what quantities, with the quality of their pro- 
duce subject to regulation, as well as the prices they 
received, from which they had to pay their taxes. 
The imposition of a cash tax in effect made work for 
money compulsory as well as facilitated the cultivation 
and export of raw materials such as palm oil and cocoa 
etc. Everywhere in the British Colonies, particularly 
British Africa, there existed one form of tax or the other. 
1 - 
Uba, Bertram. "Underdevelopment in Nigeria", Term paper 
presented to Professor Colin Ley's Department of Politi- 
cal Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, 
1979, P. 5. 
2 Woodruff, William. Impact of Western Man - A Study of 
Europe's Role in the World Economy. 1750~1960^ London/ 
1966, p. 10. 
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There are parallels ajid uniformities in the colonial 
experience of various peoples with respect to taxation 
and the development of export trade. In North America 
where the colonizer came as a settler (as opposed to a 
visitor as in Nigeria) and where ’fur* as opposed to agri- 
cultural produce was the chief export, Nancy Lurie tells 
us that as early as l646 when the ’fur’ :trade was just 
beginning to loom important to Britain the regrouped 
remnants of the once powerful Powhatan Confederacy was 
made "to pay annual tribute in ’furs’ to the Colony, an 
interesting portent of things to come for their Indian 
neighbours to the West."^ While this tribute does not 
resemble the weight and intensity of direct taxation in 
cash or kind as it existed in British Africa, the analogy 
does point to the fact that colonial peoples in general 
were made to pay for the benefit of being ruled by the 
British, While certain colonial peoples paid taxes in 
kind, others paid in cash in the form of poll tax or a 
hut tax or both. Barnes tells us what the practice in 
Nigeria was: 
In Nigeria, the practice is to make a lump- 
sum assessment on a whole village or similar 
unit. In a few places the hut or poll tax. 
is graded according to local circumstances, 
^Nancy Lurie. "Indian Cultural Adjustment to European 
Civilization" in James Morton Smith (ed,). Seventeenth 
Century America, Chapel Hill, 1958• 
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"but generally is a fixed flat rate over 
a whole territory 
The lump sum assessment was structured so that the larger 
the circle of a man’s dependents, the larger the total 
tax he has to pay. 
The average cash income per family was estimated to 
he three pounds sterling (in todays terms, about $7) of 
which one third was paid to the government in direct 
taxation alone. This tax had to be paid by every male 
Nigerian when he reached the age of fourteen, sixteen, 
or eighteen, according to where he happened to be born. 
Barnes seems biased in his analysis of the impact of 
colonial taxation on Nigerians. Comparing it with the 
incidence of taxation in Britain, he states that "while 
colonial taxation is lighter for the rich" (British worker), 
"it is also heavier for the poor" (Nigerian worker. He 
sums up with the words "It is impossible to defend this 
discrimination"It presumably did not seem discrimina- 
tory to the colonial governments of the time or if it did, 
the discrimination was not halted, since doing so would 
mean a decrease in revenue. 
The whole process of raising government revenue 
involved a complex network of interdependent relationships. 
As already stated, the colonial government depended on 
taxation for its revenue. With cash tax itself depending 
Leonard Barnes, op. cit., p. 177. 
pp. 176-178. 
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on the world demand for agricultural exports, it is obvious 
that fluctuations in the demand for palm oil, rubber or 
cocoa would inversely affect taxes and hence, government 
revenue- As we shall see in the next chapter on Indirect 
Rule, this tax situation contributed to the collapse of 
Lugard*s indirect rule in Southern Nigeria. For, in the 
face of a drastic decline in the world demand for export 
crops, in order to ensure continuity of revenue, the 
colonial administration not only insisted on payment of 
taxes but raised the existing tax structures- This natur- 
ally provoked hostilities from the natives whose lives 
were threatened by the move. Suffice to say that fluctu- 
ations in government revenue would in turn reduce govern- 
ment investment in infrastructural development — roads, 
railways, sea ports — on which the export economy depended. 
This would have far reaching consequences since infra- 
structure forms the basis of communication and transpor- 
tation in the country- 
In Nigeria, railways were the most important of 
infrastructural development and these took up a good 
share of government revenue. Railways provided the means 
for transporting palm oil, cocoa and rubber, etc. from 
the hinterland to the coast from where they could be 
shipped to their overseas markets- The strategic impor- 
tance of railway development gave it a key role in 
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deciding Nigeria’s political future. It is recalled here 
that in much the same way^ railways were crucial in the 
incorpora.tion and the opening up of Western Canada® This 
was illustrated by John Macdonald’s often quoted declara- 
tion that "Railways are my politics"® In those early days 
of Canadaj politicians like Macdonald who favoured West- 
ward expansion of railways were credited with the best 
vision for the future of the country and was considered 
a nationalist® This is more so because in the preoccupa- 
tion to create a strong British North America, there was 
a sufficient balance of forces between Central and 
Western Canada® The population pressure in Central Canada 
and the availability of capital was matched by abundance 
of land a,nd investment opportunities in the West. The 
linking of the fertile prairie farmlands to the Great 
Lakes System had both economic and political advantage 
in terms of wheat exports and confederation®* Railways 
thus seem to have played a key role in the early life of 
most colonial territories. As railway construction be- 
comes strategically important, their financing becomes a 
critical or delicate issue® 
Here government revenue is irrevocably called into 
question because such a gigantic venture was a public not 
* 
For more on Canada in the Macdonald era see Donald 
Creighton, John A. Macdonald, the Old Chieftain. Toronto s 
Macmillaji, 1955, pp. 300-30^« And, Dominion of the 
North. Toronto Macmillan, 1957, Chapter 7. 
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a private responsibilityo In particular, in the non- 
settler British Colony of Nigeria local capital and skills 
were absent. This situation was worsened by the reluc- 
tance of London financiers to invest in Nigeria*s railway 
developmento These unfavourable circumstances placed the 
entire task of financing railway construction on the 
Colonial administration. What is more, the Government 
undertook to invest in railway development. The first 
railway to be built in Nigeria was open to traffic in 
March, 1900. This was the line linking the Port of Lagos 
with the cocoa producing region of Ibadan. Thereafter, 
extensive lines were proposed for construction: a line 
from Kano down Kaduna River valley to the Niger with 
access to the southwestern cocoa region and the port of 
Lagos, Another line was proposed from Kano down the Niger 
River basin to tap the palm oil region with access to the 
south central port of Warri or Sapele. These two pro- 
posed lines which together meant about three thousand 
miles of railways were longitudinal in direction,' The 
aim was to have them run in a north-south (inland to coast) 
direction with no horizontal design at all. However, 
theory is different from practice. While these railway 
lines were proposed in paper, their actual construction 
did not materialize. Rather, it gave rise to controversy 
and quarrels. These quarrels centred around possible 
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routes (single or double)o Translated into economic 
terms, the quarrels were centred around costs. After the 
Lagos-Ibadan railway was opened, Nicolson tells us that 
the remaining railway 
"construction was delayed, partly because 
of costs, partly because of Lugard's 
dogged preference for an interior railway 
o,0 o o so that it should be entirely indepen- 
dent of Lagos and its railway» It was not 
until 1907 9 after Lugard had been replaced 
by the Royal Engineer Girouard, that the 
Lagos railway reached Oshogbo and the Secre- 
tary of State authorized both the interior 
railway from Niger at Baro to Kano^ and 
also the extension of the Lagos railway to 
meet it...''^^ 
Railway construction in Nigeria was delayed due to dis- 
agreement between Nigeria's colonial administratorss 
Lugard (North); Sir R. Moor (South) and MacGregor (Lagos 
territory). Their quarrel centred on routes, gauge and 
tariffs. But it was also a quarrel over the economics 
of railways, which was a quarrel over financing, which 
was ultimately a quarrel over the most economical and yet 
most profitable routes that railways should go. In short, 
on the back of the administrators* minds was the "maximi- 
zation of returns on railway investment”, The quarrel, 
notes Nicolson led to the appointment of an official 
committee under the chairmanship of Lord Selborne, the 
parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Colonies, to 
do the first concerted planning and to report to Chamber- 
1 Nicolson, op. cito, p. 71» 
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lain in London. 
However, Nigerian historians have failed to pay ade- 
q.uate attention to the political side of the railway 
controversyo For, I think this was the most important 
factor in the minds of the administrators o Not yet an 
amalgamated state, with the two regions still administered 
by different men under incompatible policies, it was just 
natural that the two men of the North and Southern Nigeria, 
Lugard and Moor respectively, should each have the inter- 
est of his region in mind. This is more so since indepen- 
dence of the two regions rather than integration or 
amalgamation was the Colonial theme at the timeo Until 
this time (I9IO) as Awa tells us, "Both North and South 
(Nigeria) were being administered as separate political 
entities, but each section was divided into provinces for 
administrative convenience"The continued administra- 
tion of the two protectorates as independent units gave 
rise to separate, incompatible and often competitive 
practices between the two administrations. The political 
nature and basis of the conflict has been expressed in 
Lugard*s own wordss 
Where one administration comprises the coast 
area (Southern Nigeria) and collects the cus- 
toms dues (which hitherto formed the bulk of 
the revenue in most African dependencies), 
^Awa, Erne. Federal Government of Nigeria. University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1964, pV 4. 
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while another (Northern Nigeria) forms its 
hinterland, the latter must either establish 
an inland fiscal frontier, or share the 
duties collected by its neighbourso The 
former expedient adds to the cost of all 
imports already enhanced by the inher- 
ent expense of long and costly transport 
serviceso...1 
Thus, with a deeply ingrained sense of regionalism in the 
two administrations, their railway quarrel transcended 
purely economic matters as each tried to secure the 
interests of their region. Consequently, the "most econ- 
omical and yet most profitable routes that railways should 
take" become translated into the most politically favour- 
able railway routes, that is, which scheme would profit 
the north more than the south and vice versa- 
This was a fundamental conflict that had great conse- 
quences for the future of Nigeria for, the rivalry 
stemmed from two identifiable sources. First was Lugard*s 
belief in the superiority of his northern administration 
which he had founded on indirect rule• Nicolson has 
observed that Luga.rd 
had succeeded in a propaganda campaign 
directed to the creation and manipula- 
tion of his own fame as an administrator, 
and the myth of the superiority of his 
territory (Northern Nigeria), and of his 
methods, over all others.2 
Whatever the method (propaganda, manipulation or actual 
1 Lugard., Lord: The. Dual Mandate in British Tropical 
Africa, Frank Cass^ London, 19^5- P- ” 
Nicolson, Administration of Nigeria, op. cit., p. 125* 
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achievement) hy which Lugard's deeds reached the public 
ears, the fact remains that he earned fame in London as 
the most successful colonial administrator.* Lugard did 
not want to see Northern Nigeria depend on Southern Ni- 
geria* s railway system, since this would mean subjecting 
Northern Nigeria (his symbol of achievement), to the dic- 
tates of Southernerso Thus, by seeking to secure "interior 
railways which will be independent of Lagos (Southern) 
Lines”! to borrow Nicolson’s words in fact, if the best 
possible railway deal is secured for the North, Lugard 
would ensure, not only that the distribution of power 
favoured the North but also that this region remained 
superior and dominant over the South thus perpetuating 
his honourable legacy. But this is not all there was 
between the two regions. 
Indirect rule in Northern Nigeria earned Lugard honour in 
the ColoniaJL Office on the strength of which he was assign- 
ed to Uganda and Hong Kong respectively to institute the 
system (1907“1912)o Margery Perham (Ibid, pp. 22-23) 
states that "The strong Mohammedan Emirates of Northern 
Nigeria provided Lord Lugard with the right material for 
the achievements which have made Northern Nigeria the 
classical instance of the system" of indirect, rule. In 
‘another book: "Lugard the Years of Authority”, (p. I38) 
Perham concludes that "Indirect rule in Northern Nigeria 
was Lugard*s greatest and most famous work, the achieve- 
ment of his prime". And, Crocker (Ibid, p. 68) tells us 
that Lugard*s example of indirect rule in Northern Nigeria 
"is nov; the accepted policy throughout British Africa and, 
to a large extent,, the current practice". For more on 
these observations, see Crocker, W. R.s On Governing 
Colonies, George Allen, London, 19^7.. Margery Perham, 
Colonial Sequence. 1930-19^9 - Methuen, London, 19^7« 
^Nicolson, op. cit., p. 71* 
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The second source of conflict between the two Nigerias 
relates to the different policies pursued in the two re- 
gions by the respective administrations. The two policies 
of "indirect rule" and "open door" resulted in the one 
region (the North) being founded on conservative princi- 
ples, dominated by autocratic elites at the head of which 
was Lugard himselfi and on the other (the South) being 
founded on liberal ideals, governed by modern councils and 
headed by R. Moor and MacGregor (indeed, a preparation for 
modern democratic government). The open door policy in 
the South allowed for free missionary and commercial 
activity and in the North, these modernizing forces were 
restricted. Sir Allan Burns, a one time colonial civil 
servant in Nigeria tells us that in no way was the differ- 
ence between Northern and Southern Nigeria more marked 
than in the quality of their histories. He went on to say 
that "...the lack of a uniform system of government had 
accentuated the already existing differences of race, 
*1 
religion and culture." We shall return to this in our 
\ 
discussion on indirect rule. Suffice to say that the con- 
flict was one of conservatism versus liberalism, the north 
versus the South respectively. And, Lugard was confident 
that if Northern and Southern railways were integrated, 
^Burns., Sir Allan. History of Nigeria. London; Allen and 
Unwin, 19^3, P.« U® 
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education, commerce and individualism (the inevitable 
forces of modernization which would accompany railways) 
would weaken the authority of the Moslem religion* This 
would also weaken the authroity and prestige of the Emirs, 
and would thus imperil the system of indirect administra- 
tion. 
Meanwhile, Lewis Harcourt the Colonial Secretary 
watched the quarrel between Lugard and Egerton with dis- 
may. Far from direct administration, it was normal for 
Harcourt as already noted to relieve Lugard and Moor of 
the railway quarrel by appointing a committee of experts 
on whom railway development was entrusted. But this move 
did not put an end to the conflict which looked more like 
a power struggle than a struggle bordering on railways. 
With the crisis still unresolved, Lugard was posted to 
Hong Kong where he assumed Governorship of that colony 
in 1906. He was replaced in Northern Nigeria by Sir E. 
P. G. Girouard. At this stage, the message had reached 
the Colonial Office that the two Nigerias were at stake. 
But, whatever was going on between the two Nigerias was 
not the only concern or preoccupation of Britain. 
Britain of 1912 was not exactly the same as Britain of 
1900. New concerns generated by social forces in Europe 
were demanding the attention of British decision-makers 
and the British public in general. In Europe, Britain’s 
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neighbours had acquired Britain* s industrial magic and 
her imperial ambitions. Great wars were seen again in 
Europeo Large armies were being raised and fragmented 
countries were unified. In particular, Germany was of 
concern to Britain as the shock from the Agadir crisis 
was still causing great irritation. Internally, the 
liberal government had succeeded the conservatives and 
Lloyd George was making moves that were to lead Britain 
towards a Welfare State. The result was that by the first 
deca.de of the twentieth century, Margery Perham tells us, 
”we find Britain reacting vigorously to all the motives 
for empire, trade^ security, emigration, philanthropy, 
all converging to produce the crowning motive.®."^ and 
this crowning motive was that Britain had to look again 
to her security! With these pressures, the attention of 
the British public was turned inwards. The need for 
security is analagous to the need for a strong economy 
which meant relieving the British treasury of some colon- 
ial financial burden. Colonies whose administrations 
depended on grants from the British treasury were to be 
affected and Northern Nigeria was not an exception. 
Northern Nigeria was one of the colonial territories 
that laid a financial burden on Britain. While increasing 
^Perhajti, Margery. The Colonial Reckoning. Collins, London, 
1961, po 110. 
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commercial activity in Southern Nigeria was yielding ever 
increasing revenue, Northern Nigeria remained poor due to 
Lugard’s reluctance to integrate Northern Nigeria into the 
modern capitalist system. As a result, Northern Nigeria 
remained and continued to be dependent to a small extent 
on financial assistance from thd southern government trea- 
sury. Hatch has noted that "From the first year of the 
protectorates, the South was called on to contribute to 
Northern finances."^ The contribution took the form of 
an annual subsidy and amounted to £^5,000 in 190I and in- 
creasing year by year. But this was only a small fraction 
of the dependence of the North on financial assistance. 
The imperial government bore the major burden of 
financing Northern Nigerian administration. But the Bri- 
tish Treasury was stern on matters of funding administra- 
tion of colonial territories which were encouraged to be 
financially independent. Drawing a comparison between 
Lugard*s days and the later days of colonial administra- 
tion, Margery Perham observes thats 
Today in Britain and even in Africa, 
administration is conducted upon compar- 
atively lavish standards, with a parliament 
which seems willing to vote millions with 
less reluctance than in Lugard’s day it 
voted thousands. He (Lugard) had to open 
up a vast region and create a new admin- 
Hatch, John. Nigerias The Seeds of Disaster^ Henry 
Regnery Company, Chicago, 1970, P* 185- For more on 
the revenue situation. 
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istration (in Northern Nigeria) upon a 
civil revenue made up largely by a small 
and reluctant grant-in-aid.^ 
And this grant-in-aid as Hatch tells us, "rose from 
$201,400 in 1900 to $972,000 four years later and had only 
declined to $660,000 by the end of the decade".^ The 
effect of such government expenditure in a dependent 
territory was to raise severe treasury criticism, and 
this criticism in turn induced the colonial office to con- 
sider a proposal to create a united Nigerian administra- 
tion. This would have the advantage of pooling revenue 
and costs between the two Nigerias. There were many 
arguments in favour of the idea and the most; important 
of all was the booming trade of Southern Nigeria. Be- 
tween 1906 and 1912, exports and revenue doubled. Of 
all the exports, palm produce predominated and it formed 
four-fifths of the exports. In his analysis of the trade 
of Southern Nigeria, Geary reported that in fourteen years 
(1900-1913), the total value of palm produce exported 
trippled, "rising from a value of a million and a half 
sterling to nearly five million sterling".3 The actual 
figures of this booming proceeds from palm produce as re- 
ported by Geaiy (op. cit) , himself a one time British 
^Margery Perham, Lugard; The Years of Authority, p. 139* 
Hatch, op. cit., p. 186. 
^Geary,.,W. N..Mo Nigeria Under British Rule, Frank Cass, 
London, 19^5, P- 129* 
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official in Nigeria, show that in I9IO, 173fOOO tons of 
palm kernels and 77,000 tons of palm oil yielded a total 
value of £^,193j000» Maintaining a steady increase through 
the years 1911 and 1912, the export reached a peak in I913 
with only 175,000 tons of palm kernels and 83,000 tons of 
palm oil yielding a total of £^,964,000« 
This tremendous increase in the value of palm produce 
was due to favourable world market condition. For in- 
stance , the price per ton of palm kernels at Liverpool in 
1910 was LI9 while a ton of palm oil in the same year sold 
for L33»5« In 1913, i't was L23-5 and L3^«5 respectively. 
From the point of view of the British treasury and hence, 
the imperial government, amalgamation would allow the sur- 
plus revenue acquired in the South to be used in the North, 
thus terminating British treasury responsibility to the 
North. This would then mean a relief to the British tax 
payer. It was these circumstances that gave birth to the 
decision to amalgamate the two Nigerias, a decision that 
necessitated the choice of a man who would undertake to 
study the two Nigerias and make recommendations as to the 
terms and conditions of the proposed amalgamation. And, 
as one would expect, Lord Lugard was the man chosen by the 
Colonial Office for the job. 
The reasons behind the choice of Lugard as the right 
man for the job of unifying the two Nigerias are best 
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known to the colonial authorities in charge of the Colon- 
ial Office at the time. However, his familiarity with 
Nigeria, particularly, his administrative experience in 
the North and:the popularity he gained from indirect rule 
policy in that protectorate cannot he ruled out. Never- 
theless, the unification of Nigeria demanded both a man 
and the method and this was the concern of Lewis Harcourt, 
the colonial secretary at the time. Margery Perham states 
that on June 2?th, 1912, during a debate on colonial 
estimates, Harcourt made amalgamation of Nigeria the main 
item in his speech. He also used the occasion to nominate 
a man who was to be entrusted with the new task. He is 
quoted to have said; 
"Happily the man is at hand with a tried 
and proved capacity to supply the method 
though I have been convinced ever since 
I ca.me to the Colonial Office that this 
amalgamation was desirable, I frankly 
admit that I should not have thought the 
moment opportune unless I had happened to 
knov/ and to command the services of one 
man marked out for this great work, Sir 
Frederick Lugard."i 
Whatever the qualities, real or imagined, actual or poten- 
tial that Harcourt saw in Lugard, the fact remains that 
the appointment was far from unanimous. There were those 
who were fully aware of Lugard*s excesses and arrogance, 
well enough that they aaw him unfit for the task and voiced 
i 
Quoted in Perham, Margery; Lugard; The Years of Author- 
ity., p. 390, citing British Parliamentary Debates, 27, 
June, 1912, Y ^0; 512 as the source. 
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their oppositiorio Lord Temple who was Acting Governor 
of the North and then Lieutenant-Governor of the Northern 
provinces from 19II until his retirement due to ill-health 
in 1917, expressed, according to Nicolson^ dismay on hear- 
ing of Lugard’s appointment to the task of unifying 
Nigeria. But the choice of the Colonial Secretary pre- 
vailed over all else. 
The date was October 3, 1912, that Lugard arrived 
in Nigeria with orders to commence a study tour and re- 
commend to the Colonial Secretary, the basis and form on 
which the two Nigerias should be amalgamated. Lugard 
started his inspection tour in Lagos, from where he visit- 
ed the southern ports of Calabar, Bonny, Opobo and Port 
Harcourt (suggested and named after Harcourt, the then 
Colonial Secretai?y by Lugard). He then proceeded to the 
North were he visted Kano, Kaduna and Sol^oto, the main 
seats of power in that region. With little difficulty, 
Lugard completed the inspection and office work which 
the tour entailed within five months before returning to 
London. Lugard*s critics have feared that five months 
was hardly sufficient to complete such a vast undertaking 
especially if the native figures and other colonial per- 
sonnel in the country were to be consulted and if accurate 
information on which recommendations were to be made must 
"1 " ' ‘ .., ■ ' - 
Nicolson, op. cit. , p. I83. 
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be gathered. Nicolson has argued that the reason for 
Lugard's rush was to enable him to conform to the plan of 
"continuous administration” made for him by Harcourt, the 
Colonial Secretary, in which from the date of amalgama- 
tion, Lugaxd was to become Governor-General of Nigeria, 
spending five months in Nigeria and five months in London. 
But, in particular, writes Nicolsons 
Lugard was in a tremendous hurry,through- 
out his five months, endeavouring to 
demonstrate to the Secretary of State 
that he could cram into this period all 
the travelling and inspection and office 
work which took other men a year to 
accomplish.! 
The circumstances of Lugard*s quick and brief tour of the 
country are still largely unknown and whatever the argu- 
ments for ajid against the manner in which he carried out 
his mission, the result was an eighty-eight page long 
document which he formulated under the title Report on the 
Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria, and Admin- 
istration, dated 1912-1919 which he submitted to the 
British Parliament in London. What were the contents of 
this document and whose ideals did the recommendations 
reflect? 
Lugard*s report dealt with a wide range of subjects, 
political, governmental and economic, In the political 
arena, the administrative boundaries of Northern and 
^Ibid., p. 188. 
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Southern Nigeria remained unchanged and each was to he 
headed hy a Lieutenant-Governore Lagos, hitherto a part 
of the Southern protectorate was to form a separate admin- 
istration under an Administrator* Both this and the two 
Lieutenant-Governors were subject to the Governor-General 
of the entire country who was Lugard himself* Further, 
Lugard suggested the division of each of the Northern and 
Southern protectorates into provinces, creating twelve in 
the North and nine in the South.* Each of these provinces 
was to be headed by a District Officer who would exercise 
judicial and executive powers - something analogous to 
the customary practice under indirect rule in the North. 
The provinces remained under the enclave of each of the 
two administrations which became known as Northern and 
Southern provinces. The reasons for the division were 
according to Lugard himself "all based on the principle 
of dividing the territory into a large number of units - 
from four to seven - each under the control of a high 
official responsible to the Governor-General".1 But, 
what we see in this arrangement is the continued separa- 
tion of the units of the country from each other, notably, 
Created in the North were Sokotp, Kano, Bornu, Zaria, 
Bauchi, Nupe, Kontagora, Ilorin,^ Nassarawa, Munshi, Muri 
and Yola-j and in the South, Oyo, Owerri, Ogoja, Calabar., 
Abeokuta, Onitsha, Ondo, Benin and Warri and, of course, 
the separate Administration of Lagos. See Amalgamation 
Report. p. 11. 
^Lugard, Amalgamation Report, p. 10. 
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the maintenance of the former protectorates intact and 
the separation of Lagos from the Southern Administration 
where it previously helonged. However, separation in the 
sense of continuing the territorial and political distinc- 
tiveness of the country is less serious compared to what 
took place in the governmental arrangements* 
The new government structure, the crux of Lugard’s 
recommendations was characterized hy profound separation, 
gross incompleteness and division - in fact, tending to 
ignore that the purpose of the entire exercise was to 
unify, to amalgamate the societies and their institutions• 
In what appeared to Lugard as the key government depart- 
ments, he proposed their complete merger and placed them 
under his own control as Governor-General» These were 
the departments of railways with which Lugard as Commis- 
sioner of Northern Nigeria in I906 had had a serious 
dispute with his Southern counterpart R« Moor; the depart- 
ments of Marine and. Customs which were second only to 
agricultural exports as a source of revenue and, often 
became first when exports fluctuated; and, the final de- 
partments that were centralized and fully merged were those 
of the Treasury and Audit, apparatuses which controlled, 
allocated and supervised the use of revenue. In other fields 
of government such as Posts and telegraphs. Military and 
health, separate Northern and Southern departments 
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would be preserved but with a joint head. The thread is 
seen here that the government departments which were cen- 
tralized were those designed to make the Southern region 
pay for the Northern structure. But this was not ailla 
In addition to his exclusive control over the 
"central departments", Lugard himself was solely respon- 
_sible for all legislation and, with regard to the 
principles of government, Lugard proposed the unification 
of laws and the assimilation of the policy of Native 
administration. By this, Lugard meant to have the chance 
to extend to the South the same principles of native 
administration and laws relating to direct taxation which 
Lugard had instituted in the North from 1900-1906, For, 
in his own words (Amalgamation Report, p, 8), "the South 
required a better organization of its Native Administra- 
tion and of its judicial system" while, far from such 
fundamental changes, all that the North required was ”,,, 
improvement in its departmental organization,,While 
he saw nothing wrong with the indirect rule structure in 
the North which was based on unique principles of Native 
Administration, he deemed the government by council system 
in the South as improper. The form of government he 
deemed proper for the South was the same indirect rule 
^Lugard, Lord, Report on the Amalgamation of Northern 
and Southern Nigeria. Londons 1920. p, 8. 
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system he had created in the North, As he puts its 
The system (of Indirect Rule) may thus “be 
said to have worked with good results in 
the Noirth, and I desired to introduce its 
principles in the South, It is, however, 
obvious that it depends essenti^ly on 
the principle of direct taxation, which 
provides the means whereby the Native 
Administration can pay salaries to the 
paramount chief and all other officials,• 
Men of wisdom and vision knew this innovation, the intro- 
duction in Indirect Rule in the South, was productive of 
chaos and had cautioned against it and Lugard himself 
has recalled that even his higher authority "The Secre- 
tary of State was unwilling to authorize this innovation". 
Suffice to say that Lugard was taken so much for 
granted everywhere in London as the colonial architect 
that even the Secretary of State was hesitant to oppose 
Lugard despite his difference of views® In these circum- 
stances, Lugard*s ideas and recommendations as embodied 
in his Report on Amalgamation prevailed in the Colonial 
Office. All his proposals were accepted and implementa- 
tion was to proceed. Thus, on January 1, 191^ Nigeria 
came to being for the first time as a single geographical 
p. 15. 
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unit as we know it today.* The amalgamation took place 
along almost identical lines to those Lugard recommended 
and the occasion was celebrated in Nigeria. Lugard des- 
cribes the celebrations thus s 
After the oaths of office had been taken 
at each capital - Lagos and Zungeru - by 
the Governor-General, the Lieutenant- 
Governors, and the Chief Justice, etc., a 
Durbar was held on the great plain at 
Kano, which was attended by all the chief 
Moslem rulers from Sokoto to Chad, who 
met for the first time in common friend- 
ship to swear allegiance to His Majesty, 
and by representatives of the principal 
pagan tribes. ...,it was estimated that 
not fewer than 30,000 horsemen took part 
in the picturesque display.3^ 
For sure, the celebrations brought together for the first 
time, tribal rulers both Moslem and Pagan who were pre- 
viously hostile to each other^ But their coming together 
was, as Lugard has aptly put it, ”to swear allegiance to 
His Majesty, the King of England" not to swear allegiance 
Lugard was appointed Governor-General of the new country 
simultaneously, spending five months in Nigeria and five 
in England according to the "Continuous Administration" 
plan. While he was celebrating amalgamation as an 
achievement other colonial officials saw it as .a nega- 
tive enterprise. For instance, Margery Perham, for a 
long time a colonial official in Nigeria warned in her 
book Lugard; the Years of Authority (Ibid, p. ^18) that 
the majrriage of wealthy Southern Nigeria with a revenue 
in 1912 of two and, a quairter million, to its impoverished 
Northern neighbour, with its bare half million of local 
revenue including a customs allowance L70,000 from 
Southern Nigeria, was bound in the face of total expen- 
diture to bring both into conflict. So without vision 
as to the dangers that laid ahead, amalgamation was 
implemented. 
1 Amalgamation Report. p. 8. 
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to "the new nation" into which the rulers and their tribes 
were incorporated. 
The foregoing analysis thus gives rise to many ques- 
tions. Did the traditional rulers recognize the issues 
involved or have any vision as to the future objectives 
of what they were celebrating? How would these societies 
that only a few years earlier had been rival and often 
hostile, live together under one state? Should they form 
a nation? If so how could a single allegiance be created? 
By the way, what was the central objective of British 
policy? Was it to build an empire permanently subordinate 
to Britain, or to encourage a national spirit leading to 
ultimate self-goverment? Not only did no one appear to 
Imow the answers to such questions, but the questions do 
not seem to have been asked. Nor, have we been provided 
with answers to the questions but this paper shall attempt 
an interpretation of the event in the light of the conse- 
quences that have arisen. 
When Lugard was given the task of effecting Nigeria's 
ajnalgamation, it was certain that he would be biased in 
whatever scheme that he came up with. And, his bias as 
has been demonstrated was a sort o'f pro-Northern and anti- 
Southern Nigeria. He would try to apply the policy he had 
instituted in the North (upon which he earned his reputa- 
tion) and in which he believed as a basic principle of 
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government for colonial peopleso Thus, the most profoimd 
and far-reaching aspect of the policy he adopted in 191^ 
was the continued separation of the North from South and 
the strategy to establish hegemony of the former over the 
latter. To achieve this objective, Lugard sought first 
to rule the South on the basis of the North; second, to 
make the South pay for the Northern administration and; 
third, to tilt the railway balance in favour of the North. 
We reserve the first point for treatment in the next 
chapter but the second and third points, finances and 
railways respectively shall presently occupy us. 
Noting on page 7 of his Amalgamation Report that up 
to the period of amalgamation, the material prosperity 
of the South was increasing with astonishing rapidity and 
that customs duties based on railways were a major and 
steady factor in this progress, Lugard recalled his earlier 
quarrel with Sir R. Moor, the Governor of the South over 
the issue. He writes? 
To the financial dilemma, there was now 
added a very pressing difficulty in re- 
gard to railway policy and control. The 
North, to ensure development of its trade 
and to secure its customs duties, commenced 
a railway from Baro, a port on the Niger 
to Kano«]_ 
Adding that this had been pressed for by himself, not only 
on these grounds but in order to render the realization of 
p. 7. 
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Northern revenue, he went on to states 
That the South responded by pushing on the 
Lagos railway to the frontier, and obtained 
the Secretary of State's sanction to carry 
it on to the North, to effect a junction 
with the Baro-Kano Line at Minna oi 
Thus, we see from this conflict why amalgamation enter- 
prise gave Lugard the opportunity to achieve his earlier 
(see pp* 79“B6 ) preference for an interior railway, so 
that it should be entirely independent of the Southern 
railways. This is too the reason why the railways, customs 
and treasury were the first government departments that 
Lugard centralized in his amalgamation scheme. It is also 
the reason why his adjustment of these factors preceded 
the creation of ajiy new administration. What did these 
actions mean to Nigeria's multi-tribal society? 
In his pro-Northern drive, Lugard either knowingly 
or unknowingly antagonized relations between the North and 
South, thus intensifying the traditional hostilities be- 
tween them. Such hostilities would be expressed not at 
the time of amalgamation (when the balance of power was 
being deliberately shifted in favour of the North because 
Lugard's authority over the whole Nigeria was at this time 
unrivaled) but in the years that laid ahead. On almost 
every count, it is clear that this form of amalgamation, 
based on a keen interest in one region at the expense of 
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the other, in fact, a kind of federation without federal- 
ism, was unsatisfactory. The application of the scheme 
lit a series of explosives that would generate not only 
the growing suspicions, frustrations and antagonisms of 
Nigerian community against Nigerian community, but also 
resentment against British rule, In a sense, instability 
seems inevitable, given the patterns and characteristics 
of the colonial processes as a whole. Essentially, it 
was the implementation of indirect rule in the South that 
brought all the inherent conflicts into the open., It is 
therefore appropriate to examine how indirect rule created 
further cleava.ges between the North and the South. 
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CHAPTER IV 
INDIRECT RULE AS UNIFORM GOVERNMENT 
In this chapter, we will analyze tribal cleavages 
arising from the adoption of indirect rule as a imiform 
government. For one of the most striking features of 
this rule was its emphasis on the re-organization of 
Southern Society and institutions along Northern feudal 
lines. This occurred in three fundamental aspects? 
1) the creation of a new Native Administration system 
2) the appointment of chiefs to head each of the new 
administrative unit s and, 
3) the substitution of indirect with direct taxation. 
It is also interesting to note that Lord Lugard, the 
man behind this exercise is the same man who^ was Governor 
in the Northern Nigeria from I9OO-I906. During this 
time, he successfully established indirect rule there. 
But, the mistake made by Lugard himself and the colonial 
office in London was the false assumption that indirect 
rule policy could be adapted to native peoples everywhere 
irrespective of their differences. As this research has 
discovered, the policy can succeed only under certain con- 
ditions. This is why we have borrowed Weber's concept 
of 'patrimonial society* to illustrate on the one hand 
that Northern traditional socio-political structure was 
organized along patrimonial linesi that is why indirect 
rule was successful in the North, And, on the other hand 
our analysis illustrates that a patrimonial society did 
not exist in the South and that was why indirect rule 
failed there. In general, the uniform government as re- 
flected in the new native administration system, the 
chieftaincy rule and in the institution of direct taxation 
can all be seen as an attempt to patrimonial!ze the South. 
Northern personalities played a crucial role in the ex- 
tension of patrimonialism to the South, as a result of 
which the North was charged with attempting to dominate 
the South through collaboration with their colonial ally 
- Lord Lugard. 
The amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria 
necessarily gave rise to issues such as the form of rule 
to be adopted® That is, whether to continue to apply the 
initial separate policies of liberalism in the South and 
of conservatism in the North or to adopt a universal form 
of rule for the amalgamated country. If this latter 
course, then what form of rule would be justified to the 
main divisions of the country; and how shall such a rule 
be established without generating conflict? Questions 
such as these did not seem to concern Lord Lugard the 
amalgamator of Nigeria, who saw it fit to adopt indirect 
rule as uniform government. 
The adoption of indirect rule as a universal form of 
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government upon amalgamation in 1914 brought about the 
extension of patrimonialism to the south*. This has three 
fundamental implications; first, the replacement of the 
existing system of county councils; secondly, the replace- 
ment of council members as heads of the administrative 
units; finally, the abolition of indirect taxation* All 
these were replaced with Northern models and with the help 
of Northern elements. Above all, they were models of the 
policy on which Lugard earned his reputation as a success- 
ful Admini strait or. 
It was Lugard*s hope that these policies would bring 
the South on the same plane as the North. In fact, it 
was a design to extend the influence of his allies - the 
Hausa-Pulani ruling class - to the Southern peoples. It 
also would put an end to the rivalry between the two ad- 
ministrations, giving victory to indirect rule as a 
superior method of government, thus gratifying Lugard 
himself. In several parts of the world, colonial admin- 
istrations have assumed that all the native peoples under 
their charge were organized in states, sometimes in states 
of a specific kind. In any colonial territory administer- 
ed as a unit, it is convenient to have a uniform system 
of native administration which can be applied by field 
officers wherever they are stationed and which can easily 
be adapted to territory-wide action. An indigeneous model, 
if it appeals to the administration, may be used even in 
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areas where the indigeneous political system is of quite 
another kindo Thus, in Nigeria where the British were 
impressed with the efficiency of the Hausa-Fulani state 
system in the Northern protectorate, Hausa-Fulani models 
were used for the administration of other parts of the 
country, namely, the Southern protectorate. In some of 
these areas (e.go Yoruhaland of South Western Nigeria) 
the traditional political system had indeed been largely 
similar to that of the Hausa-Fulanii but in other parts 
(Iboland of South Eastern Nigeria), there had been state- 
less societies of various kinds. 
The British did not appoint Hausa-Fulani notables as 
paramount chiefs of these non-Hausa-Fulani areas. Instead 
a scheme of native administration incorporating native 
authority and native courts, along with direct taxation 
was introduced using Hausa-Fulani patterns as the basis 
of administration. Step by step, villages were regrouped 
into larger units and a leader was appointed to each unit. 
In Yoruhaland of the Southwest where some chieftaincy had 
traditionally existed, chiefs were persuaded to accept 
the reforms and, where opposition was encountered, the 
chief was deposed and one favourable to the administration 
was installied. Further, where new chieftaincy was due, 
the administration bypassed traditional procedures of 
selection and appointed a favourable one. On the other 
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hand, in Iholand of "the Southeast, the appointed leaders 
carried the title "warrant chiefSome of the men 
selected as "warrant chiefs" were ritual leaders or their 
descendants, others were rainmakers or leaders of rain 
shrine cults. A genuine effort seems to have heen made 
to appoint those who had a traditional claim to chiefly 
office, for it does not seem to have been realized that 
indigeneously there were no chiefs. The administratively 
created chiefs have no traditional legitimacy and there- 
fore have no traditional models to guide their conduct. 
More importantly, there are few or no institutionalized 
ways in which the community can exercise a check on their 
conduct. Moreover, the distributed authority character- 
istic of statelessness is incompatible with the hierarchi- 
cal administrative and judicial system which asserts mono- 
poly of executive and adjudicative power. 
In both state and stateless societies, that is 
Yorubaland and Iboland respectively. The colonially main- 
tained chiefs could create a difficult situation. Hogbin^ 
has shown how difficult it can be for an administrator to 
realize that one of his warrant chiefs is exceeding his 
T 
For a detailed analysis of the origins of the warrant 
chief system, the reader should consult A. E. Afigho, 
The Warrant Chiefs. Londons Longman, 1972, pp. 37"77* 
This is the best textbook ever published on the subject 
of warrant chiefs. 
2 
Hogbin, H. I,. Experiments in Civilization. Routledge, 
London, 1939, PP® 141-159* 
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powers, and how hard it may he to take effective action 
even when the administrator does realize what is happen- 
ing. Indeed, in a stateless society, it may be almost 
impossible for a man appointed as chief to carry out his 
duties efficiently in the eyes of the administration 
without at the same time exceeding his powers* He has 
the force of the administration behind him, but he has to 
assert his authority over his people and demonstrate to 
them that he must be obeyed5 they do not automatically do 
what he says. His own definition of his role is unlikely 
to coincide exactly with the definition intended by the 
administration, and there is no traditional model for him 
to follow. Hence, he is likely to do either too little, 
and be acceptable to the people but inefficient in the 
eyes of the administrations or too much and become a 
tyrant. Since his status is unprecedented, there are no 
traditional mechanisms for limiting his power. Since he 
is the nominee of the administration, he is bound to get 
its support, and often there is no efficient way by which 
the common people can bypass the local autocrat and com- 
plain directly to the administrator. 
Whatever the traditional form of political organiza- 
tion, the local representative of the colonial administra- 
tion, (namely, warrant chief) has to employ some members 
of the indigeneous population full-time in order to carry 
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on the day-to-day “business of administration. They may 
he employed as policemen, porters, clerks or even as 
interpreters a No system of administration seems to be able 
to operate entirely without this buffer of local employees. 
It would be impossibly expensive to operate with only ex- 
patriate labour, whether or not it was thought to be in 
the best interests of policy to do so. The group of 
indigeneous public servants, if they be so called, tend 
to identify themselves with their employers and to adopt 
in many respects, the values and attitudes of the admin- 
istration. They may be able to exercise a fairly complete 
control over the activities of their superiors, particularly 
if the expatriate administrator cannot speak the local 
vernaculai% Mitchell^ has shown that the indigeneous pub- 
lic servants are often able to exercise considerable 
power even when they are dealing with traditional primi- 
tive states. With stateless societies, there are usually 
fewer checks against the abuse of authority imposed from 
above, and their position is likely to be even stronger. 
At the one extreme is Iboland, where a court clerk was 
feared and highly respected by the community.^ Similarly, 
a chief, the Alafin ^f Oyo, incorporated more villages 
1 —  
Mitchell, J. C. ”The political organization of the Yao 
of Southern Nyasaland”, African Studies. Vol. VIII, 
19^9, PP. 141-159. 
Perham, Margery. Native Administration in Nigeria. 
Londons Oxford University Press, 1937, P* 202. 
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into his jurisdiction than the administration originally 
assigned himo^ Thus far is the background to our under- 
standing of the circumstances, and outcome of the estab- 
lishment of a uniform system of native administration 
within each territory of Nigeria, even though there were 
very considerable differences between one territory and 
another. 
Lord Lugard has observed in his amalgamation report 
that "the system of indirect rule has worked with good 
results in the North, as a result of which I desired to 
introduce its principles in the South".^ Indirect rule 
is the uniform system of administration adopted upon amal- 
gamation in 191^<• It is based on the principles of native 
administration and among its essentials are a hierarchy of 
recognized chiefs, the concentration of authority (execu- 
tive and judicial) with these chiefs and above all, 
direct taxation, which provides the means whereby the 
native administration can pay salaries to the chief and 
all other officials. Direct tax, a major source of revenue 
was paid by the people in the name of the chief and to 
the chief, from whom the colonial administration appro- 
priates the money. This system could not succeed except 
^Obafemi, Awolowp. Path to Nigerian Freedom. Londons 
Faber and Faber, 19^7, P« 115• 
^Lugard, Lord. Report on Amalgamation of Northern and 
Southern Nigeria. London, 1920, p. 15» 
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where a society is organized around a single dominant 
ruler who exercises authority over a large area, and who 
has district heads under him to conduct administration and 
to collect taxes a This, therefore, meant the creation of 
a hierarchically structured native administration system 
in Yorubalanda Here the society has traditionally shown 
a mixture of patterns and styles found in Northern and 
Eastern Nigeria. The hierarchical elements are consider- 
ably more evident in Yoruba communities than among the 
Ibos. But these small kingdoms and chieftaindoras differ 
from their Hausa-Fulani neighbours because Yoruba units 
have often been quite independent, or else, only loosely 
united. Meanwhile the new native administration scheme 
required autocratic, powerful chiefs such as those 
existing in the North but, contrary to this type, Yoruba 
chiefdoms incorporated both aristocratic and democratic 
principles, and as such were not autocrats. But, this 
situation did not discourage the administration from 
carrying out the new reforms. 
Once again, the realities of Yoruba social organiza- 
tion and the policy of the previous (direct) administra- 
tion did not enter into the minds of the new colonial 
administrators. Under direct administration, Yoruba 
chiefs and their people were left largely alone to fend 
for themselves, and to manage their civil affairs as of 
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old within the limitations of good conscience, and the 
principles of justice and equity. Any trespass beyond 
these confines invited the swift and firm response of the 
administration. Side by side, the British officials of 
the time conducted their civil administration in respect 
of such members of the community as cared to avail them- 
selves of British justice and fair play at its local 
fountain. For this purpose, British officials ran their 
own courts and local constabulary. So colonial adminis- 
tration existed alongside traditional chiefdoms with 
neither interfering in each others affairs. 
When Lugard arrived with his indirect rule package, 
this co-existence gave way to conflicts. For instance, 
the relative independence from each other of Yoruba chief- 
doms was ignored as hierarchical native administration 
system was introduced. Under this system, various clans 
were grouped together and one influential clan chief was 
made paramount over the other equal clan chiefs. Obafemi 
Awolowo, a one time Governor of Western region and later 
leader of the opposition in the federal parliament re- 
calls how indirect rule reformed his home districts 
When in 1914 the indirect rule system was 
introduced into the Southern provinces, 
Ijebu Remo was detached from the colony 
district and merged with Ijebu Ode for 
administrative purposes.q 
T - - 
Awolow, Obafemi. ”Awo” Cambridge University Press, 19^0, 
p. 17 «• See-all his publications for more on Yoruba 
history and colonial complications. 
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The suzerainty of the latter was established over the 
former and, the "Oba.* acquired a more enhanced status and 
authority”o 
These reforms were hardly complete without the most 
important key position in the indirect rule systems an 
overall supreme chief, a chief to whom the entire Yoruba 
people must pay allegiances It is important to note that 
this was another example copied from the North, For, it 
was deemed that this key position would parallel the 
” Sultan” of Sol^oto who was the overall chief of the 
Hausa-Fulani Emirs, This pivotal position was essential 
because the supreme chief would act both as the reci- 
pient and payee of taxes. Thus, the "Alafin” of Oyo was 
made supreme chief over the entire Yorubaland and, 
Lugard tells us that the Alafin*s authority was recognized 
by all.f In this delicate arrangement, Awolowo reports 
that the "Olubadan (chief) of Ibadan was mistakenly sub- 
ordinated to the Alafin of Oyo”, and the latter behaved 
oppressively toward the former,2 While the Yorubas never 
Different chiefs at different places carried different 
titles e.go Oba of Benin and Alafin of Oyo, Oba and 
Alafin are titles while Benin and Oyo are the seats of 
the chiefs. In academic use the term "Oba” is used to 
describe Yoruba chiefs generally. Here v/e shall re- 
tain the use of "Alafin” of Oyo because of the distinc- 
tive event involving the office of that chief, 
Lugard: Amalgamation Report, p, l6. 
Awolowo, 0. Path to Nigerian Freedom (op. cit.), p. 115. 
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had such an overall chief "before in their history, the 
colonialists nevertheless hoped that the Alafin would 
v/ield as much power as the Sultan of the Hausa-Fulanis» 
But the Yoruhas are not used to the Hausa-Fulani type of 
subordination. 
The subjection of one chief to another, or the 
subordination of several chiefdoms to a single chief 
automatically implied the subordination of the subjects 
of the former to the authority of the latter, an unpre- 
cedented event in Yoruba history. Consequently, there 
was a, blow to the prestige aind personal aggrandisement of 
the chiefdom thus subordinated, and a rude shock and 
humilia.tion to the erstwhile exclusiveness and pride of 
his people. This could be a delicate situation especially 
if the Alafin, excited by his newly acquired authority 
over his former rival peers, behaved autocratically and 
oppressively. But such behaviour seemed to be inevitable 
under indirect rule. In fact, the Alafin had to demon- 
strate to his colonial authorities that he was capable 
of governing and, he could not get his former colleagues 
to obey him except by coercion. Moreover, the colonial 
administration ensured this by arbitrarily increasing the 
powers and jurisdiction of the Alafin. As Awolowo once 
complained3 
The dictatorial powers which some Yoruba 
chiefs are wielding today are the making 
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of the British Government, who at the 
beginning misconceived the true nature of 
Yoruba monarchy.i 
Some of their dictatorial powers were expressed in their 
attitude towards taxation. 
The acceptance by the newly created hierarchy of 
chiefs of indirect rule as the method of administration, 
did involve the application in their area of authority of 
the principle of direct taxation. Of course, one of the 
major conditions for recognizing any chief was his accep- 
tance of direct taxation. As a result, Lugard tells us 
that ’’During 1918, taxation was successfully introduced in 
Yoruba” and that in "one centre £3,^00 was paid in 2k hours 
and in another, a similar sum was received in six hours”. 
The total tax received in that year amounted to £72,000 
in Yorubaland alone. The estimate for the following year 
(1919) almost doubles the I9I8 figure. It is unreasonable 
to accept these tax figures as furnished by Lugard. But 
if the figures are right, it is not certain whether the 
tax was paid voluntarily or merely out of feeir. What is 
not uncertain is the fact that in the same year direct 
taxation was introduced, 
”In June, 1918, a serious rising broke out 
in the Western district. The telegraph was 
destroyed, a section of the railway was 
torn up, a train carrying specie was de- 
railed and its escorts besieged in a station.2 
-1 
■^Awolowo, Obafemi. Ibid. , p. ^8. 
2 Lugard, op. cit. , p. 15» 
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There was region-wide outbreak of disturbances and in Oyo 
province, 
”..othe native court at Okeho was burnt and 
the chief and those who had supported the 
new..system murdered. At Iseyin, close to 
Oyo, the people not only burned their court 
but fired upon the troops, and it was some 
months before the movement was suppressed. 
A government Commission of Inquiry was set up to investi- 
gate these incidents but, since the findings were never 
published, the precise causes of the unrest is not known. 
However, experts close to the sources including Margery 
Perham believe that the unrest was induced by indirect 
rule and ultimately, direct taxation. The disturbances 
therefore represent the people’s "inborn loathing of any 
form of direct taxation".2 Thus, in Yorubaland the 
institution of autocratic chieftainship (with the excep- 
tion of Benin) and the whole apparatus of indirect rule 
including direct taxation, all failed in the Southwest, 
It was pushed into the Niger forests of the Southeast, an 
area inhabited by the Ibos. 
If indirect rule was unsuccessful in Yorubaland 
where some measure of chieftaincy traditonally existed, 
it was to prove more cataclysmic in Iboland where the 
traditional organization is different. Among the Ibos 
^Perham, Margery. Native Administration in Nigeria, (op. 
cit,), p. 77. 
%Md. , p. 76. 
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of Southeastern Nigeria, neither the Yoruba monarchical 
nor Hausa-Fulani partimonial structure existed» Himmel- 
strand compares Ibo with Hausa-Fulani society and tells 
us thats 
The social structure and lifestyle of the 
Ibos are in many ways almost the diametrical 
opposite of those prevailing among the 
Hausa-Fulanis. While the largest traditional 
political unit among the Hausas and Fulanis 
was the great Hausa-Fulani Empire with its 
hierarchical structure, the largest tradi- 
tional political unit among the Ibos was 
a, collection of neighbouring villages with 
a, common meeting place that served both as 
a ritual and political centre, as well as a 
marketoi 
Having drawn this comparison, he went on to provide fur- 
ther description? 
Every village had a locail council of elders 
and council of title holders who enjoyed a 
certain degree of authority in the village 
0 ^,»Nor was there any central authority 
that bound together the clusters of vil- 
lages , except for a small number of reli- 
gious oracles whose services were used by 
villagers throughout Iboland and who, 
over a period of time, tool^ advantage of 
their religious power to build up a certain 
measure of economic and political influence.2 
The lack of centralized political authority and of a unified 
political organization over all of traditional Iboland are 
characteristic features of what social anthropologists 
1 & Ulf. "Tribalism”, Regionalism, Nation- 
alism and Secession in Nigeria" in Eisenstadt and Stein 
Rokkan (eds.). Building States and Nations. Beverly 
Hills? Sage Publications, 1973j P«> ^37* Details of the 
structure of traditional Ibo society can be found in I. 
Nzimiro, Studies in Ibo Political Systems. Londons Frank 
Cass, 1972* And, M. M. Green. Ibo Village Affairs. 
London; Frank Gass, 1964. 
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call a segmentary political system. Segmental and 
uncentralized traditional Ibo society may have seemed 
primitive and undeveloped to the ignorant Western European 
minda This view is more or less the one British Colonial 
authorities seem to have had of the Ibos in early colon- 
ial years. To them, isolated people, with neither 
royalty nor aristocracy nor a political hierarchy seemed 
to be a primitive people. But whether or not this was 
the reason and justification for extending indirect rule 
to Iboland remains an issue to be verified. 
It was in realization of the statelessness of Ibo 
Society that Lugard’s predecessors established an admin- 
istration that utilized Ibo egualitarian values. This, 
in sharp contrast to that of the North, involved direct 
administra.tion in which native councils were set up to 
carry out the art of government. Under this government- 
by-council as it was known at the time-^ Arthur Norton 
Cook tells us that "No single rul^r exercised authority 
over a large area so that it was necessary" for Lugard 
"to build a new system rather than repair one already in 
existence".! Thus, Lugard abolished direct administra- 
tion in the South and replaced it with indirect government 
based on the Northern model. This involved essentially 
the appointment of chiefs and the creation for them, of 
^Arthur Norton Cook',' British Enterprise in Nigeria, Frank 
Cass, London, 19^4, p. 194. 
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extensive areas of jurisdiction<, Lugard describes the 
process thuss 
The first step is to endeavour to find a 
man of influence as chief, and to group 
under him as many villages or districts as 
possible, to teach him to delegate powers, 
arid to take an interest in his native trea- 
sury, to support his authority and to 
inculcate a sense of responsibility.! 
He appointed chiefs and delegated authority with the co- 
operation of the Hausa-Fulanis whom he could count on for 
his adventures in the South. In particular, since the 
present task involves the extension of Hausa-Fulani 
influence to the South, they wasted no time in co-operat- 
ing. Without the knowledge of Southern officers, a 
delegation of Northern officers headed by a resident was 
sent to undertake a tour of the South and to recommend 
potential men who would be appointed chiefs.* In the 
process, the delegation wrongly identified the lineage 
elders (in Iboland) as the local repository of authority 
despite the fact that the elder was usually no more than 
the spokesman for the village meeting. When the delega- 
tion carried their discovery to Lugard, Hatch reports that 
"The elders were therefore invested with 
the powers of government and justice that 
Lugard, op. cit. , p. l4. 
H. R. Palmer who led the delegation was one of the men 
with considerable experience in the North and on whom 
Lugard relied for his actions affecting Southern Nigeria, 
Officers who served in the South before 191^ were neither 
consulted nor took part in.Lugards actions in the South. 
See A. E. Afigbo, op. cit«, pp, 155“15^» 
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they had never before possessed. Inevitably, 
therefore, they came to be regarded by the 
local people under their power as tyrants 
representing British rule rather than as 
representatives of their own communitiesoi 
Chiefs in the sense used in the North did not exist and 
the term "warrant chief” was used for those men who had 
been picked out by the government and given warrants as 
sole authorities and as presidents in the native courts. 
Among those appointed in Iboland was Warrant Chief Okugo^ 
who was given jurisdiction over Oloko, a densely populated 
area in Owerri province. The warrant chiefs were often 
of recognized authority in their own bureaucratic enclave 
but not out side that unit. In relation to their people, 
they were often unrepresentative and unpopular. They were 
put upon a panel of judges and the court area seemed to 
bear little relation to any natural social grouping. 
And so Lugard artificially created conditions 
principally to facilitate the establishment of indirect 
administration. The jurisdiction of these warrant chiefs 
included the power to make by-laws, rules and orders 
(having the force of law) and judicial authority. When 
the power to exact taxes was added, their executive power 
^Hatch, John. Nigeria. Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 
1970, p. 192. 
Perham, Margery. Native Administration in^Nigeria. Ox- 
ford University Press, London, 1937 , P» 206^. Other 
important warrant chiefs includes Chiefs Mba Okoli of 
Ibe tribal area;. Igwegbe of Odum and Chukwuani of Nkanu. 
For further list, see A. E, Afigbo, op. cit., pp. l4l-42.^ 
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was complete. Before amalgamation, the form of tax main- 
tained and paid by the Southerners was indirect tax, 
which mainly came from trade in spirits but with the 
dawn of indirect rule came a change from indirect taxation 
to direct tax policys 
,..I was accorded permission (by the Secre- 
tary of State in London) to introduce direct 
taxa.tion in Yorubaland, Egba, and Benin on 
my own responsibility, and subject to the 
proviso that both chiefs voluntarily agreed 
to it...oThe Lieutenant-Governor (Sir H, C. 
Clifford) expresses the view that before 
many years, the tax should yield a revenue 
of a million sterling, thus fully replacing 
the indirect tax accruing from duties on 
spirits. 
The replacement of indirect with direct taxation consti- 
tutes a dramatic turn in the orientation and practices 
of the Southern peoples. These people in the past had 
to pay occasional dues to their authorities but they 
were q,uite unfamiliar with regular taxation on the basis 
of the properties they owned. And, unlike their less 
sophisticated and less assertive fellow Africans in East 
Africa, they were very ready to resist this attribute of 
civilization. The British had not attempted to impose 
direct taxation upon the Gold Coast (now Ghana) where, 
fortunately, the prosperity of the cocoa trade allowed a 
very adequate revenue from customs. In Sierra Leone, the 
attempt to introduce a hut tax in I898 had caused a very 
1 Lugard, Amalgamation Report, pp. 15-15 
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serious revolt, only put down with a very heavy loss of 
life. With the memories of this tragic event in mind, 
and similar experiences in East Africa, well thinking 
colonial personnel including the Secretary of State for 
colonies opposed Lugard's decision to introduce direct 
taxation in the South. 
The opposition came from distinguished colonial 
figures. E. D. Morel, one of the best informed experts 
of the period, in his book on Nigeria published in 1912, 
’’had given a strong warning against any brusque introduc- 
tion of the tax in Southern Nigeria after fifty years of 
association (with Britain) without such taxation".! Even 
one of Lugard’s "resident’s" in the North, H. R. Palmer 
who had hea,ded the delegation that studied the South and 
recommended on the appointment of chiefs, reported "that 
Southern officials believed that the Northern system of 
direct taxation was inapplicable in the South'' .^ Lugard 
himself recalls that "The Secretary of State was unwilling 
to authorize this innovation" in the tax system,^ The 
position of these opponents was basically that direct taxa- 
tion was best suited to territories whose inhabitants 
possess an organization where chiefs with large regions 
^Quoted in Perhara, Margery. Lugarda The Years of Authority 
1899-“19^5» Londona Collins Press ,1960, p. 443 • 
^Ibid/, p. W. 
^Lugard, op. cit., p. 15* 
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and large powers also had large budgets as, for example, 
northern Nigeria, where the tax was of course very successful. 
!The opponents rightly saw that these conditions were not 
present in the South. Secondly, Lugard's opponents were 
aware that from the time the British Merchant Firms (e.g® 
the Royal Niger Company) exercised jurisdiction over the 
southern peoples through to the period of formal coloniza- 
tion in 1900, the form of tax paid in the south was indirect 
tax. The people had become accustomed to this tax and a 
change would be conflictive. Finally, the attempt to 
introduce direct taxation elsewhere as already pointed 
out, had in many cases produced tragic results. However, 
in spite of the opposition, Lugard proceeded with the 
introduction of the tax in the south "on his own respon- 
sibility”. 
From the point of view of Lugard’s government, direct 
taxation was not only a recognition of sovereignty of the 
people, it was the moral charter that "all civilized 
nations recognized the principle of direct taxation of 
f - ■ 
the individual in proportion to his wealth, and the pro- 
tection and benefits he receives from the state".^ The 
view v/as also held that direct taxation brought the "war- 
rant chiefs" (the recipients and payees) into closer 
contacts with the peasantry than any other of their func- 
^Nicolson, I. F. Administration of Nigeria 1900-1960. 
Oxfords Clarendon Press, 1969, P« Iw. 
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tions. While the government would never use taxation as a 
means of enforcing labour, by using it as a means of recog- 
nizing the rights and responsibilities of the individual, 
the system would have the indirect effect of stimulating 
production? for men would know that they must pay tax but 
would be free to keep their surplus- But the view that 
direct taxation would make warrant chiefs appear not as 
hard exploiters, but as sigents who would free the common 
man from the burden of heavy and capricious exactions was 
seriously misconceived. Margery Perhaml has told us that 
the "Southerners were very ready to fight this attribute 
of civilization" meaning introduction of direct taxation- 
And, Nicolson adds that "serious outbreaks of disorder 
followed"^ the introduction of direct taxation in the South. 
By far the most serious trouble occurred in the Egba 
territory in 1918, the first territory in which direct 
taxation was introduced. This was followed by riots in 
Warri in 192? and I929 by the extensive and serious womens* 
outbreak, generally known as the Aba riots. A common 
pattern revealed in all these disturbances is the attack 
^Perham, Margery. Lugards The Years of Authority, p• 4^3» 
9 , • 
"'Nicolson, op. cit., p. 213«, 
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on Warrant Chiefs* and on government bureaucracies, 
institutions obviously identified as attributes of the 
peoples grievances. In other words, the events demonstrate 
that the simple pattern of a single dominajit ruler with 
district heads under him to conduct administration and 
to collect the new tax simply did not fit the Southern 
system. It had. been too far out of touch with the people 
to observe their accumulating grievances. 
The people's grievances against the introduction of 
direct taxation was aggravated by the events of the first 
world war (191^-1918). The start of the war coincided 
with the amalgamation of Nigeria in 191^j and disrupted 
Nigeria* s trade with Germany thus, causing a decline in 
revenue. As a result of this situation, Geary^ and many 
others have argued that the extension of direct taxation 
to the South was due to Lugard*s desire to raise compen- 
satory revenue. For, direct taxation would guarantee a 
certain amount of government revenue thus avoiding the 
The gap in the periods between the riots is justified by 
the fact that direct taxation was not introduced simul- 
taneously everywhere in the South. The years of the riots 
correspond with the year of introduction of the tax. 
The plan had been laid down, by Lord Lugard so that even 
after his departure in 1919; his successors implemented 
the plans without modification. It is logical to argue 
that the decision to space out introduction of the tax 
stems from Lugard*s uncertainty as to the success of this 
innovation. For more on the implementation of the amal- 
gamation scheme after Lugard*s retirement, see Margery 
Perham, op, cit . , p, 464, 
^Geary, W, N., M, Nigeria Under British Rule. Londons 
Frank Cass. , 19^5» 
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fluctuations associated with indirect taxation^ On the 
other hand, Nicolson^ and Margery Perham^ have argued that 
the extension of direct taxation to the South was part of 
Lugard*s attempt (emhodied in the amalgamation scheme), 
to re-structure the South on the Northern modelo They 
argued that the nev/ native administration and the associated 
direct taxation was part of Lugard* s broader picture of 
extending to the South the same model that had earned his 
reputation in the North and which he deemed ideal for 
ruling native people» However, underlying these viewpoints 
is the fact that at the time of sporadic unrest in the 
country export trade had declined, affecting not only 
government revenue but also the incomes of the tax payers. 
A large net fall in real exports occured in Nigeria 
because it was cut off from its German export market. 
Germany accounted for about 50 per cent of Nigeria’s pre- 
war exports ajid for about 75 per cent of its principal 
export - palm produce. Shipping restrictions and a dis- 
criminatory export duty which forced export of palm 
products to the United Kingdom also adversely affected 
Nigeria’s exports. The result of these measures was a 
drop in Nigeria’s revenue from £3>178,000 before the war 
to b2,831,000 at the end of the war, a loss of roughly 
^Nicolson, I. F. Administration of Nigeria, op. cit. 
^Dame Margery Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, 
and Lugard; The Years of Authority. 
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X6fo^^ To deal with the revenue deficit there were two 
remedies - reduction of government expenditure, or increase 
of and new taxation and, as Geary tells us, "The govern- 
ment took the latter alternative”This shows that there 
is a direct relationship between taxation in the South 
and the occurrence of sporadic riots* Further illustra- 
tion substantiating this point can be made from the Aba 
riots o 
One of the areas most seriously affected by the 5G^ 
decline in trade due to prohibition of exports to Germany 
was Aba in Ibolando The area was seriously affected be- 
cause the cultivation and export of palm produce (oil and 
kernals) was the main economic activity* Here a good pro- 
portion of the population were either producers or 
middlemen (traders) or engaged in allied services such as 
transportation and bookkeeping. Conseq.uently their live- 
lihood depended on the prosperity of the export market. 
As export of oil and kernels was reduced, so was production 
and the incomes of those engaged in the industry. But 
they were not alone in feeling the impact of the decline. 
For government revenue had also declined and measures were 
•3^ 
The imperial trade preferences were adopted in 1919, dif- 
ferential export duties on both tin and pailm kernels were 
designed to reserve these Nigerian exports for the United 
Kingdom alone. These measures also succeeded in stopping 
United States companies from infiltrating Nigerian mar- 
kets. For more, see Geary, W. N. M., Nigeria Under Bri- 
tish Rule. Frank Cass, London, 19^5* ^he public debt of 
Nigeria outstanding 31 March 1923 is LI3,609,200. 
^Geary, op. cit*, p. 260. 
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underway to increase revenue through taxationo In the 
circumstance, a government ordinance emerged which provided 
for additional tax on the people. And, according to Per- 
ham 
...•Officers were instructed to assess the 
average income of the peasant farmer and 
to take 2.5 per cent as a reasonable rate 
of tax.3_ 
In the process of assessment, women as well as children 
and property were counted. Then rumour began to spread 
that the purpose of counting women was to enable the 
government to extend the new taix to them. For, the new 
tax had already been imposed on the men. Meanwhile, fear 
arising from the rumour (which was unfounded) provoked 
over-reaction from the women. In a surprise move, they 
organized and launched attacks on warrant chiefs, district 
officers and on court buildings - all institutions per- 
ceived to be symbols of their oppression. This was the 
climax of similar but less serious tax related outbreaks 
of disorder in Kwale and Warri Districts and, as the Aba 
riots guickly spread to other palm producing centres of 
Owerri, Opobo and Calabar, the government took no chance. 
A counter-attack from the police force resulted in the 
death of over thirty women and another thirty-two injured. 
A subsequent government inquiry revealed that "taxation 
^Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, op. cit., 
p. 203. 
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of this kind was entirely foreign to their customs”*^ 
From the point of view of the government, riots of 
this kind are a manifestation of primitive behaviour» 
Violence is the only way illiterate people can express 
their grievances thus justifying brutal government reac- 
tion. On the other hand, the women demonstrated their 
ability to organize, to mobilize and to act collectively 
in defense of their common interests. Above all, it shows 
that indirect rule (which made no use of the people's 
traditional customs and institutions but was based strict- 
ly on principles imported from the North) was unsuitable 
as a method of ruling the South. It is upon this realiza- 
tion that the people rejected the system and opted for 
one that utilized their traditional values. Having thrown 
overboard the new 'warrant chief*, native administration 
system, the Ibosj 
Chose instead a system of local government 
largely taken from the British model of 
County-councils, District Councils (urban 
and rural) and Ijocal Councils, based mainly 
upon straight election.2 
The Ibos are not the first colonial people to reject 
indirect rule but their action serves as a challenge to 
the imperial conception that indirect rule was the best 
form of governing native peoples. This gives rise to 
^Perham, Ibid. , 1937* 20? 
^Perham, Margery. Lugard; The Years of Authority, p. ^r6S» 
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guestions regarding the appropriateness of the term 
indirect rule as it was applied in Iboland* If we accept 
the definition of indirect rule as ”a method of ruling 
people through their native institutions"^ then we must 
ask to what extent was indirect rule really native in the 
South} had it had any roots in the past or been in har- 
mony with existing institutions and social groupings? As 
we have just seen, as far as its application in the South 
is concerned, indirect rule has meant the implantation of 
Northern social and political institutions- Therefore, it 
is appropriate to revise the meaning of indirect rule to 
read *a method of ruling native people through institu- 
tions borrowed from other colonial peoples®• This defin- 
ition not only corrects the mistakes of the previous mean- 
ing, it arms the colonial researcher with better instru- 
ments of investigation- 
In the previous chapters, we concentrated on 
amalgamation and indirect rule and argued that tribal 
cleavages in Nigeria was generated by characteristic 
colonial policies- We must now fit the consequent politi- 
cal conflicts into these colonially induced cleavages, 
in order to obtain a more balanced and complete picture 
of disunity in Nigeria- 
^Lugard’,. Lord. The Dual Mandate in British Tropical 
Africa, Londons Archon, 19^59 P* 193• 
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CHAPTER V 
RECENT INCIDENTS OF CONFLICT 
In this chapter, we shall survey some important inci- 
dents of conflict as pointers to the colonial legacy. We 
shall hegin with a brief discussion of the development 
of the nationalist movement and the crises that character- 
ized it. This will lead us to examine the first tribal 
massacre in Kano in 1953? ihe difficulties that plagued 
the transition to independence in i960 and the subsequent 
disintegration of the first Republic, Finally, we shall 
look at the most appalling of all, the 10,000 tribal murders 
and the ensuing civil war which lasted from I967 to 1970• 
Given the nature of the problems associated with amalgama- 
tion and indirect rule, one might predict continuing 
troubles associated with this forced and unnatural union. 
This was indeed the case, 
The declaration of the American President* on the 
right of all peoples to self-determination and also, the 
writing of new world negroes like W, E, Du Bois and his 
antagonist, Marcus Garvey, inspired the founding of the 
National Congress of British West Africa in I92O. The 
party was led by a Gold Coast (now Ghana) lawyer Casely- 
^ — 
Woodrow Wilson was president at the time and his declara- 
tion of support of the right of colonies to self- 
determination set a spiral of nationalist movements all 
over Asia and Africa, See Ronen, The Wilsonian Principles 
of African Self-determination, San Franciscos African 
Judies Association, 1975® 
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Hayford and its aim was that peoples of West African 
descent should participate in the government of their own 
country. But, its fight was not so much for self-government, 
but for a measure of participation in the existing govern- 
ment.l The activities of the National Congress of British 
West Africa stretched from putting pressure on local 
colonial authorities to direct talks with the Secretary 
for the Colonies in London. And, it has been suggested 
that these activities compelled the then Governor of Nigeria 
to introduce some changes in the constitution of the 
country.^ 
Consequently, in the year 1922, the Governor of 
Nigeria, Sir Hugh Clifford introduced a new constitution, 
which for the first time in British African colonies pro- 
vided for elected African members on a legislative council* 
This council legislated for Lagos colony and the franchise 
was limited to returning three members of the council 
every five years*3 But the limited application of the new 
elective principle inevitably restricted nationalist acti- 
vity to Lagos, since there was little scope for political 
activity in towns which had no seats on the Legislative 
T   
See Onwuka, Dike, 100 Years of British Rule in Nigeria 
18-^l-1951. Lagos, 1957, P. 35- 
Kalu, Ezerao Constitutional Developments in Nigeria. 
London, I96O0 
^Sklar, R. L. Nigerian Political Parties. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 19^3, p. W. 
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Council. As a result, on June 2^, 1923, Herbert Macaulay 
inaugurated the Nigerian National Democratic Party 
(NaN.D.P,), The aims of the N,N,D.P*, beside seeking 
to return members to the council, also included local 
matters such as agitating for adequate water, educational 
and hospital facilities. Though this party was very local 
in its basis and in interests, it nevertheless marked the 
beginning of broad based and wider nationalist movements. 
From about 1929 to 193^, "tb.e political climate of 
Lagos had begun to spread as people soon realized the 
benefits of such collective organizations. The Lagos Youth 
Movement was formed in 193^j which in 193^ was renamed the 
Nigerian Youth Movement and the Movement was strengthened 
in 1937 by the return to Nigeria of Nnamdi Azikiwe, after 
nine years as a student in the United States. From this 
time on, the party*s restricted outlook was abandoned and 
it became geared into a genuine national movement with a 
broad representation. But, this party, exclusively com- 
posed of Southerners (Ibos and Yoruba) was short-lived. 
Rivalry over who should stand for the vacant Legis- 
lative Council seat led to the effective demise of the 
party and brought the first tribal feeling to the core. 
"Nnamdi Azikiwe left the party with all his tribal 
followers, so that the party became effectively a Yoruba 
13^ 
controlled organization”Then Azikiwe founded the 
National Council of Nigeria and the CamerounSj (N^C.N.Go) 
a predominantly Iho party, obviously to counter the 
Yoruba dominated Nigerian Youth Councilo The N.C,N.C, 
with Azikiwe as its leader declsired its objective as 
"To achieve internal self-goverment for 
Nigeria whereby the people of Nigeria and 
the Garaerouns under British Mandate shall 
exercise executive^legislative and judicial 
powers»'* 2 
While the N.G.N.C. assumed a nationalist posture at least 
in ideology, its composition was tending more and more 
to be tribally based. Its main adherents were members 
of the Ibo tribe of whom the party's leader, Nnamdi 
Azikiwe was one. The result of the division was the 
absence of a single dominant party supported by both Ibos 
and Yorubas, The first sign of tribal politics and 
ultimately, of tribalism had now surfaced in the South, 
The tribal structure has basically defined the political 
structure ajid it seemed as though the moment had dawned 
for conflict. However, despite appearances, the major 
threat to stability lay not between sections of the South- 
ern region organizing against each other, but between the 
North and the South, 
While tribalization of politics and, in fact, 
^Michael Crowther, The Story of Nigeria. Faber and Faber, 
London, 1978, p, 228. 
^The Constitution of N«C,N.C. . Lagos, 19^5, P- 1«» 
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political activity was going on in the South, the North 
remained isolated as it watched with indifferenceo There, 
Colonial rule had deeply entrenched the power and rule of 
the nobility. Moreoever, the disallowance of Christian 
Missions and educational institutions in the region meant 
that there was no educated class to champion political 
activity {reference discussion on Indirect Rule). The 
consequences of these past policies were now apparent! 
Whereas the Southerners were determined 
tha.t Africans should attain majority con- 
trol of the executives, operating on a 
ministerial system, the North preferred to 
retain the British Commissioners as execu- 
tive authorities with power to appoint their 
own executives, who would remain solely in 
an advisory capacityoi 
So a major rift developed between the two regions regard- 
ing an issue so fundamental as the nationalist movement. 
The South adopted an anti-colonial attitude and the North, 
a pror^colonial stance. There can be no doubt that this 
is a reflection of their colonial past - for, colonial 
rule, right from its inception did not prepare the two 
regions for peaceful co-existence as a nation. And, this 
division was never to be resolved peacefully except by 
violent tribal warfare. 
But, more importantly, the North’s lack of inclina- 
tion toward party politics was not so much a reflection 
of their indignation as it was a result of official policy. 
Hatch, John. Nigeria: The Seeds of Disaster. Chicago: 
Henry Regnery, 1970, pp» 25^-255• 
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For, official government policy continued to insulate the 
North from what was generally known as subversive influences 
from the South. Since the traditional form of government 
in the North had largely been preserved, there was little 
opportunity for western-style politics. As a result, 
the Legislative Council which established a franchise in 
the South in 1922, deliberately excluded the North. Thus, 
from 1922 to 19^6, when the Southerners began to partici- 
pate in Western style politics and in the making of their 
own laws, the Colonial Governor was the sole legislator 
for the North.1 Meanwhile, the constitutions of 19^6 and 
1951 introduced the principles of regionalization and of 
limited self-government to the regions respectively.* 
These innovations led to the polarization of nationalist 
leaders and the emergence of political parties which vied 
for control of these legislaturess the Action Group party 
led by Obafemi Awolowo replaced the Nigerian Youth Move- 
ment as the strongest Yoruba party in the Westj the 
N.C.N.C, party remained the stronghold of Ibos in the East, 
and, finally, the ban on party politics in the North had 
now been lifted and the Northern Peoples* Congress emerged 
^Crowther, Michael. Op cit, , p. 229» 
% 
These were the Richardson (19^6) and the Macpherson (1951) 
Constitutions, which divided the country into three 
regional assemblies - North, East and Western regions. 
For details, see Kenneth Post, Nigerian Feder^ Election 
of 1959. Londons Oxford University Press, 1963- ~ 
137 
as a Hausa-Fulani party. Thus, tribalization of politics 
was now concretely completed. Each main tribe had now 
formed its own political party, which would henceforth be 
used to further tribal as opposed to national interests. 
They had now prepared for open tribal confrontation and 
hostilities at the federal level. Time was the only fac- 
tor holding back these tribal groups and their tribally 
defined political structiures, from engaging in hostili-. 
ties. 
As the regional parties continued their struggle for 
a claim to national representation, they ran into conflict 
over the date on which self-government was demanded. 
For, an Action Group (Yoruba party) member, Chief Anthony 
Enaboro ha.d tabled a motion in 1953, calling on the Feder- 
al House of Representatives to accept "as a primary 
political objective, the attainment of self-government 
for Nigeria in 1956".^ The North and the South were 
divided on this issue. The Northern members felt their 
region was unprepared for self-rule and remained not only 
indifferent to the 195^ dead-line set by the South, but 
also indefinite about its timing. This division between 
the North and the South over an issue so fundamental as 
this was rooted in the former’s suspicion and fear of the 
^Schwarz, Walter. Nigeria, Paul Mall Press, London, I968, 
p. 106. 
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latter* s dominance,* a phenomenon that Emerson rightly 
described5 
Everywhere the coming of independence 
particularly under democratic auspices 
tend to rouse fears of dominance of one 
group over another a 
Here, the Northerners suddenly found themselves threatened 
by Southern domination; people upon whom the Northerners 
had looked down in the past, but whose present greater 
formal education had meant a more rapid advance under 
colonialism. 
Differences between the North and the South allow 
the members of ea.ch to view members of the other as out- 
siders, Indeed, the subjective sense of tribalism always 
depends on this interaction. By taking its standards into 
account and using them as criteria to assess its own 
judgements, performances or those of the South, the North 
was exhibiting its tribalism. The South was intolerant 
to Northern tribalism and exhibited its own tribal regional 
interests by remaining uncompromisingly in favour of 1956 
as deadline for self-government. In opposition to the 
Northern fear was published in the Newspaper in the follow- 
ing words5 "Now it is evident, therefore, that when this 
country has got a responsible government, the South will 
lead the North, We are neither jealous nor envious but it 
is unna^tural for a minority to rule a majority, honestly," 
*Pilot* 28 August 19^7, cited in W, R, Crocker, Self- 
Government for the Colonies, Londoni Allen and Unwin, 
IW, P. 57. 
1 
Emerson, R. ."Nation Building, in Africa", in Deutsch and 
Foltz (eds.). Nation Building. New Yorks Atherton Press, 
1966, p, 99^ 
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Northern rejection of the self-rule deadline^ Southern 
leaders representing the N.GoN.C, and Action Group parties 
¥7alked out of the House. After the adjournment of the 
\ 
House, Coleman tells us that 
the Northern members were subjected to 
insults and abuse by (the predominantly 
Ibo and Yoruba) Lagos crowds, and during 
the ensuing weeks, they were ridiculed and 
strongly criticized by the Southern press 
With this assault, the Northern members returned to their 
homes resolved never again to involve themselves in South- 
ern politics and seriously contemplated secession from the 
federation.2 
That one can view attacks on leaders of one tribe 
(the Hausa-Fulani) by the leaders and press of other tribes 
(Ibos and Yorubas) as a light concern is quite untrue. 
Here we can see without going further that the mistake of 
191^ (when the North and South were amalgamated) had come 
to light. In the eyes of the Southerners, the refusal of 
Northern leaders to endorse the self-government motion 
meant that these leaders were "unrepresentative of their 
people", "have no minds of their own" and were therefore 
"imperialist stooges".3 On the other hand, the Northerners 
viewed Southern demand for self-government in 195^ S-S 3. 
^Coleman James. Nigerias Background to Nationalism. 
University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
1958, p. 309. 
2 Schwarz, op. cit., p. 232. 
^Coleman, 1958, op. cit., p. ^00. 
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device to dominate the former by virtue of the latter's 
presently greater formal education and material standard» 
It seemed as though the 191^ exercise in amalgamation and 
in indirect rule which portrayed the Northerners as allies 
of the Colonialists had not faded from the minds of 
Southerners. Moreover, inequalities in European education, 
wealth, values and general ways of life (arising from past 
differential colonial policies) was now beginning to de- 
fine relations between the Hausa-Fulani and the Ibos and 
Yoruba. For, by stating that the North was "unprepared” 
far self-rule in 195^, the leaders were implicitly or 
explicitly acknowledging that they lagged behind the South 
in acquisition of modern values and institutions.^ 
Suffice to say that the abuse on Northern leaders by 
Southern crowds and the continuing attacks by the Southern 
press have laid the groundwork for wider tribal hostili- 
ties . One of the Southern leaders, a Yoruba and leader 
of the Action Group party, (Obafemi Awolowo) who earlier 
had accused Northern leaders of being "despots and British 
stooges", announced a tour of the largest and most impor- 
tant city in the North-Kano. With deep resentment still 
^ _ 
It may be argued that perhaps the Northerners didn't want 
to modernize. If so, then the Northern colonial adminis- 
trators did not want to see the North modernize either. 
Why then amalgamate the North with the South which wanted 
modernization? How were both peoples to participate in 
the modern nation-state system? We have devoted Chapter 
IV to this issue and the reader should consult it for 
that point of.view. 
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fresh among Northerners over abuses and charges made on 
their leaders by Southerners, it was obvious that 
Awolowo*s visit to the North would pull the trigger of 
Northern reprisals against the Southo Though the visit was 
banned '*at the last minute" , its "publicity had been 
sufficient to excite deep resentment by local, people against 
the South" However, the ban on Awolowo's visit did not 
deter hostilities from taking their coucse. A scheduled 
meeting by Southern political leaders to campaign for 
self-government in 195^ in the Northern city of Kano quick- 
ly turned the event into four days of rioting. Northerners 
attacked Southern residential quarters in the city and 
there were 277 casualties, including 36 deaths.^ Tribal 
conflict has thus tended to characterize relations between 
the communities at the first definite attempt at Western 
style political existence. Colonial policies of direct 
and indirect rule have differentially shaped the attitudes 
and thinking of the Northern and Southern peoples, with 
the result that the South was anti-colonial rule and the 
North was not. The Kano incident was however, only the 
beginning of a series of tribal conflict that would justify 
^Michael Crowther, The Story of Nigeria, p» 233» 
^Sklar, 1963, op cit., p. 132. An official Commission of 
Inquiry attributed the riots to tribal tensions, the 
immediate cause of which was persistent criticisms of 
Northern political and traditional leaders by Souther-, 
ners. See Report on the Kano Disturbances. l6th. 17th^ 
18th and 19th May. 1953 (Kaduna. 1953) 
what Crocker has told us that 
"’instead of there being a Nigerian nation,»» 
the artificial administrative entity of 
Nigeria created by the British has all the.,, 
tensions of a multi-racial society”2^ 
One need not argue with Crocker, for the colonialists linked 
the country together tenuously with the institutions of 
law and order in 191^ and failed to equip the communities 
for national integration. 
The Kano riots had brought tribal and regional anta- 
gonism to the open. It triggered the demise of the 
existing constitution and the resumption of fresh consti- 
tutional. talks as a result of which a new date (1959) for 
r 
self-government was fixed and accepted by the contending 
parties. Independence however came in i960 under conditions 
of tribal suspicion and mistrust. The long separation of 
North from South seemed to have left too deep an impres- 
sion for even the post independence state to succeed. 
Moreover, the imbalance in the constitution, whereby poli- 
tical parties remained tribally based meant that the North 
(whose population almost doubles the South and which had a 
very disciplined electorate)* would always win majority of 
1 
Crocker, W. R> Self-Government for the Colonies^ George 
Allan, London, 19*^9, P«» ^2. 
*The Northern region contains over half (5^ per cent) of 
the total population of the country (1953 Federal elec- 
tion) and in the 1959 Federal election, the Northern 
Peoples* Congress party won a pluralitys 1^3 seats out 
of 312 seats. The curious thing in this election is that 
all but one of the 1^3 seats were won in the North - re- 
flecting their disciplined electorate. The N.C.N.C, (ibo 
based party) ran second with 89 seats and the Action Group 
(Yoruba based) came third with 73 seats. See Sklar, 
Nigerian Political Parties, op. cit., p. 508. 
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seats and hence ever remain the ruling party* In a situa- 
tion so tense in tribal consciousness and antagonism, one 
can hardly expect that tribal majority rule itself is the 
basis of justice* The failure of the constitution to 
redress this imbalance between the regions, the tribes and 
the political structure, bedevilled politics in the years 
following independence. Referring to this phenomenon, 
Simon tells us that instability is prevalent in post- 
independent Nigeria because the colonialists who drew the 
constitution "distributed power unevenly between the re- 
gions and pla.ced most of it in the hands of the Conservative 
traditionalists who ruled in the North"This is the 
background to our understanding of the events that led to 
the first military coup. 
Barely six years after independence, a regional 
election in the Yoruba territory (Western region) was 
guickly turned into a ground for competition between the 
Hausa-Fulani dominated Northern People's Congress Party 
and the Yoruba dominated Action Group Party. The Northern 
Peoples* Congress, acting through a newly formed party, 
Nigerian National Democratic Party (N.N.D.P.), sought to 
expand its influence among the Yorubas. And, the Action 
Group party indulged in active resistance to N.P.C. expan- 
sion. Disagreements and quarrels between party leaders 
J. Simon's review of Dr.P. E* Ollawa*s book in 
African Social Studies. #20, Dec. 1975» P« 830. 
and their supporters, led to terror, riots, arson and 
murders in the regiono Estimates show that about 2,000 
lives were lost during the incident.l Tragically signifi- 
cant here is the tribal tension sparked off by the incident 
Some of the victims were Hausas and their Yoruba supporters 
while the majority of the troops dispatched to quell the 
riots were not sympathizers of the Northern Peoples* Con- 
gress in the West, 
Meanwhile, the military, fresh from its active parti- 
cipation in the Second World War in Cameroun and Burma and 
most recently, the Congo (now Zaire) crises kept a watchful 
eye on the inability of the leaders to rise above the 
limitations of their society. Perhaps it is true that the 
soldiers would not remain indifferent to a situation where 
law and order had broken down as some have argued or that 
they were driven by their own desire to have their share 
of the * national cake*. Or yet still that the soldiers 
were nationalists and therefore, their intervention in 
politics was in national interests,* Whatever the argu- 
ments for and against the intervention of soldiers (whose 
^John Hatch, Nigeria, op. cit. , p, 2?8, 
For a wide variety of theories that explain military inter 
vention in politics, see Eleazu, Uma 0. "The Role of the 
Military in African Politics: A Reconsideration of Exist- 
ing Theories ^d Practices’’ The Journal of Developing 
Areas. April, 1973, PP® 25o-86. And, Claude E. Welch, 
Jr, "The Roots and Implications of Military Intervention", 
in Soldier and State in Africa. Evanston, 111. , North 
Western University Press, 1970, PP® 3^-35* 
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primary duty is to defend and not to rule) in politics, 
it is the tribal element and the conflict induced by such 
intervention that is of utmost importance to us here. 
The date was 15, January, I966 when a group of army 
officers, chief among whom were Majors Ifeajuna, Okafor, 
Anuforo and Nzeogwu (all Ibo) planned assassination of 
political leaders* Among the victims were the Prime 
Minister of the country Tafawa Balewa (North)j the tradi- 
tionaJ- leader and Premier of the Northern region, Sir 
Abukakai and the Premier of the Western region, Chief 
Akintola (an active supporter of the Northern People's 
interest in the West). In the military arena, high rank- 
ing Northern and Yoruba Officers in the army were assassin- 
ated,^ Following the assassinations, the military comman- 
der, Major-General Aguiyi Irons! (Ibo) assumed presidency 
of the country. The acting president made the announce- 
ment 3 
I have tonight been advised by the Council 
of Ministers that they had come to the 
unanimous decision voluntarily to hand over 
the administration of the country to the 
Armed Forces of the republic with immediate 
effect. I will now call upon the General 
Officer Commanding Major General Aguiyi 
Irons!, to make a statement to the nation 
on the policy of the new administrationo2 
^Kirk-Green, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria, Vol. 1, Oxford 
University Press, London, 1971, P» 30- 
^Quoted in Kirk-Green, Ibid., p, 36, Citing Government 
Notice #147/1966 as source. 
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The unhappy side of the mutiny is that tribalism was 
inexorably implicated in the conflict. 
First, the ringleaders of the coup were all Ibos and 
it naturally came to be interpreted by the Hausa-Fulani 
and some Yorubas as an Ibo conspiracy against the Hausa- 
Fulani.* Secondly, the victims of the coup were mostly 
Hausa-Fulani and some. Islamized Yorubas and, finally, none 
of the Ibo political leaders and military officers was 
killed, despite the fact that the Governor-General (Presi- 
dent) of the country, the Military Chief and many federal 
ministers were Ibos, as well as having an Ibo premier in 
the East. The real intent of the coup is yet to be deter- 
mined but an interpretation of the coup’s outcome seemed 
to give massive credence to its anti-Northern character. 
In the North, fears that the coup had been directed toward 
establishing Ibo hegemony became particularly acute when 
the new military Head of State, Ironsi (Ibo) introduced 
a new constitution in which 
"The former itegions are abolished, and 
Nigeria grouped into a number of terri- 
torial areas called provinces, Nigeria 
ceases to be what is described as a 
Federation, It now becomes simply the 
Republic of Nigeria.i 
Whether this interpretation is correct or not is still 
being debated. It is difficult to reach a concensus on 
this issue. However, this writer is convinced by the 
events that followed the coup that the above interpre- 
tation is the correct explanation of the event, 
^Press Release No, 723. Federal Ministry of Information, 
Lagos, 24 May,1966 (Cited in Schwarz, op, cit., p, 205» 
14? 
The announcement simultaneously unified the Federal and 
Regional Public Services and the country became a unitary 
statej administered directly from the federal capital a 
Here, the abolition of regional autonomy and the creation 
of unitary services was seen by Northerners as a design 
by an Ibo leader to get his educated fellow tribesmen 
(indeed there was a great mass of them compared with that 
of the North) to dominate positions in the civil service 
from top to bottom* The North would then cease to be 
masters in their own home* 
However, critics have maintained, in addition to the 
tensions, grief and fears that the coup had generated, that 
the new Military Head of State did nothing to allay the 
fears of some communities, that the tense situation was 
particularly unsafe for his centralization policy and then 
that these policies contributed to the human slaughter 
that followed. But this was not the only factor. Among 
Northern Army officers, there was still considerable 
bitterness that the leaders of the coup have not been 
brought to justice for murdering their senior colleagues, 
an exercise which robbed the North of its tiny military 
and political leadership. Perhaps doing justice to the 
plotters was not the priority of the new military leader- 
ship which instead occupied itself with constitutional 
arrangements. However, the delay in brining justice to 
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the men on whom justice was due meant that Northern 
patience was running out. 
It was July of the same year that Northern army offi- 
cers launched massive reprisal of human slaughter against 
the Ibos, The Iho Military Head of State (General Irons!) 
was killed while on a visit to Ibadan, along with his 
host, the Governor of the West, Colonel Fajuyio The kill- 
ings stretched from military barracks to Ibo civilian 
populations throughout the West and the Northern regions. 
It was estima.ted that 10,000 army officers and civilians 
of Ibo origin were murdered in the reprisal.* A young 
Northern Army Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Yakuba Gowon 
then assumed presidency of the country. 
In the eyes of political economists, the assassina- 
tion of Hausa.-Fulani by Ibos and the counter-assassination 
of Ibos by Hausa-Fulani is a reflection of competition 
for rescources and opportunities.^ This is sun over- 
simplification and falls far short of an insight into the 
forces that have conditioned the Ibos and Hausa-Fulani. 
This figure may underestimate the total number killed. 
Eastern regional government sources put the number of 
victims at 30,000. Given the political climate at the 
time, there can be no doubt that the figure was mani- 
pulated to serve political ends. .See Odumegwu Ojukwu. 
Biafra. New Yorks Harper and Row, 1969, P- 7- 
^Anise, Ladun. ’’Ethnicity and National Integration in 
West Africas Some Theoretical Considerations", in Raymond 
Hall (ed.). Ethnic Autonomy - Comparative Dynamics. 
New York, Pergamon Press, 1979,P« 316. 
Different motivating grievances are more fundamental than 
the variety of different tribal groups. For5 the Ibo 
grievances against colonial rule and the Hausa-Fulani 
antagonism tov/ard the Ibos for their anti-colonial acti- 
vity indicates that colonial rule did not eq,uip them with 
what Mazrui has called "the psychological accumulation of 
a shared national experience"The Ibos and Hausa-Fulani 
did not have a common subjective identification focused 
around - education, Western representative political 
institutions, economic institutions 'and the values of com- 
petition, success and achievement as well as individualism 
- that serve as center point and expression of their sen- 
timental attachment to one another. At Independence, the 
Ibos had considerable advantage over the Hausa-Fulani in 
all the factors mentioned above and consequently, posed a 
serious threat to their northern neighbours. Tribal 
competition may sharpen or may help to weaken these struc- 
tura.1 inequalities but does not explain it. 
However, the wave of tribal massacres seemed to have 
reached a point of no compromise as the Hausa-Fulani coun- 
ter offensive against the Ibos in July 1966 merely repro- 
duced among the Ibos, the same effects that the initial 
Ibo offensive had on the Hausa-Fulani. Suspicion of a 
^Mazrui, Ao Cultural Engineering and Nation Building in 
East Africa. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1972, p. 277- 
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Hausa-Fulani grand design to dominate the South prevailed 
among the Ibos who have now begun to seek refuge in separ- 
atism, Fearing that they were better off in a sovereign 
state than in a federation dominated by Hausa-Fulani 
conservatives, the Ibos sought independence by forcefully 
breaking out of the federation and declaring the Republic 
of Biafra in May 1967,^ At this peak, the two contestants 
took up arms and that same year saw the declaration of 
war by one tribe on another, thus, tearing apart, a nation 
that v/as crea.ted in 191^ with the primary purpose of shar- 
ing a common national life. 
Meanwhile, the Yorubas, hitherto merely observing 
the Ha.usa-Fulani and Ibos contesting with one another, 
saw little alternative than to join forces with the Hausa- 
Fulani (though v/ith the latter's pressure) in fighting to 
preserve an entity that the colonialists loosely linked 
together. The war lasted from 19^7 io 1970, a year 
period. The total number of deaths from starvation and 
diseases will never be known; nor will the casualties re- 
sulting from fire-power, but they certainly run into 
it 
Lieutenant Colonel 0, Ojukwu, the then Military Governor 
of the Eastern Region and leader of Ibos led the secces- 
sion. Compromises and attempts by the Head of State of 
the Federation, Major General Gowon, to., persuade Ojukwu 
to back down from independence failed. The most notable 
of the attempts was the Accra (Ghana) Convention which 
rather intensified the tension between Ojukwu and Gowon, 
Efforts at peaceful negotiations have now failed and only 
time was needed for the bullets (rather than humans) to 
begin to speak. For more see Kirk-Green, Structure and 
Conflict in Nigeria, Vol, 2. 
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millions* Thus ended the tragic event that rocked the 
country, shook the world and stimulated social scientists 
to seek explanations. 
To posit that this civil war was a continuation of 
traditional tribal antagonism as the Pluralists, the 
anthropologists and the tribalists* would have us believe, 
means to deny that amalgamation and indirect rule did occur 
at all. This sort of approach thus robs the social sciences 
of any concern with the dynamic processes of societies, 
the fundamental impact of colonialism on Nigeria. It is 
not meant here that traditional animosity did not exist 
prior to the advent of colonial rule but we cannot under- 
stand why Nigeria 
approached independence without the unify- 
ing effect of a shared spirit of anti- 
colonialism,^^ 
and the conflicts that followed, by ignoring the circum- 
stances that gave rise to the nation's existence in the 
first pia.ce. Colonialism made it difficult for Nigeria's 
tribal communities to merge, amalgamate, and develop into 
new collectivities with new and/or emergent identities. 
The conflicts we have surveyed may thus be seen as the 
culminating twists to a spiral of violence that had been 
*Refer to Chapter III for the viewpoints of these schools 
of thought. 
^Ali Mazrui adds that this was due to a basic Anglophilia 
that was prevalent among Hause-Fulauii elites. See this 
books Violence and Thought; Essays on Social Tensions 
in Africa. Longmans. London. I969, p.113. 
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Political integration is the central problem of 
modern Nigeriaa Disunity has been a characteristic of 
national life since the withdrawal of Colonial rule in 
i960. As has been proven in this thesis, much of the 
problems of unity are rooted in the country® s colonial 
past. 
Beginning from the establishment of formal colonial 
rule in 1900, colonial policy effectively insulated the 
two component parts of Nigeria (the North and the South) 
from each other in the name of autonomous colonial pro- 
tectorates. This division or separation was further 
a,ggra.vated by the adaptation to each region of essentially 
incompatible and diametrically opposed governmental poli- 
cieso 
Indirect rule policy in the North preserved as well 
as strengthened conservative traditional feudal institu- 
tions. Northern Colonial government policy ensured this 
by deliberately prohibiting modernization of the society 
and its institutions and values.^ European missionary 
agencies and commercial firms - the carriers of modern 
education and capitalist values respectively - were not 
allowed to operate in the North. In the political arena, 
^Hatch, John. Nigeria - The Seeds of Disaster. Chicago! 
Henry Regnery, 1970, P» 190. 
European democratic liberal ideals did not find their way 
into the Northern political structure which remained 
essentially patrimonial in character and autocratic in 
method. 
These policies pursued in the North not only took 
the region a generation behind times, but also prevented 
the development of its human and material resources. 
This "undevelopment” was reflected in the relatively alarm- 
ing shortage of educated and skilled personnel. Above all, 
the region as a whole and the government in particular 
suffered chronic poverty.^ Poor government revenue meant 
that the administration was not financially self-sufficient. 
Hence, the North had to depend on grants-in-aid from the 
British government to finance its administration. This 
dependence continued until Britain decided to terminate 
the burden by forging amalgamation whereby the 'wealthy* 
South would take over the task of financing the North. 
Why was the South in the position to shoulder this 
responsibility? Contrary to the indirect rule policy 
pursued in the North, the government of Southern Nigeria 
encouraged effective integration of Southern Society into 
the British model. The system of "direct” administration 
ensured this through liberal policies. Missionary agencies 
^Birnberg and Resnick. Colonial Development: An Econo- 
metric Study. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975, 
p. 21. 
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were encouraged to proselytize and to establish schools 
for the people* And, Europeaui enterprises developed the 
capitalist mode of production* The Southerners responded 
eagerly to these novel values* In massive numbers, they 
attended missionary schools where they acquired modern 
skills and education. In addition, the material resources 
of the South were greatly developed. The export to Europe 
of cocoa, palm produce as well as some minerals (tin, 
etc.) resulted in considerable wealth in the South. Huge 
government revenue furnished the capital for further 
development - a fact which in the eyes of Britain merited 
amalgamation. 
In the political sphere, rather than autocratic rule 
as in the North, the Southern government 2?uled by councils* 
Representatives, both European and African, participated 
in collective decision making. A preliminary move, which 
at least, gave Southerners the chance to acquaint them- 
selves with Western type of institutions. It seems though 
that the price paid for all these trends was the erosion 
of traditional values as well as the authority of tradi- 
tional institutions* 
The preponderance of these modernizing social, econ- 
omic and political trends in the South constituted a leap 
forward (and not as in the North a step backwards). It 
has thus become obvious that colonialism took the North 
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and the South further apart. Colonialism did not establish 
integrative institutions but rather differential patterns 
which emphasized existing differences as well as created 
new ones thereby furthering the divisions between the two 
regions. For all practical considerations, these trends 
were not aimed at preparing the two regions for peaceful 
CO-existence as a nation. One thus begins to wonder why 
amalgamation of the two regions was effected in 191^» 
In chapter three, we showed that the single most 
important factor that gave the push for amalgamation was 
the desire to relieve the British tax-payer of the burden 
of financing the Northern administration.^ It was deemed 
that by amalgamating the two protectorates, the South 
could assume the task of funding the North. This was more 
so since the South was booming in trade and wealth. This 
overriding financial factor overshadowed any consideration 
as to what the consequences of amalgamation might be for 
Nigerian communities and their future. Moreover, amalga- 
mation was effected without first ensuring that the need 
for national existence did in fact exist; second, that 
enough time had been allowed to facilitate the objective 
and that adequate preparations have been provided; and 
finally, that amalgamation was the choice of the peoples 
of the two regions and that the move was in the best 
interest of both. 
%icolson, I. F. The Administration of Nigeria: 1900- 
i960. Londons Oxford University Press, 1969, PP• 180-215. 
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Leaving these fundamental issues largely unaddressed 
and proceeding with amalgamation (which served external 
rather than internal interests), there was no doubt that 
the union was doomed to fail. However„ colonial practice 
did not stop there. The continuation of divisive policies 
as epitomized by the advent of a uniform rule ensured that 
disunity was to accompany the union of North and South, 
In chapter four, it was shown how the adoption of 
"Indirect rule policy” as a uniform method of government 
for the amalgamated state further intensified divisions 
between the North and South, This form of government which 
ha-d its origin in the North; where it was best adapted, 
was merely extended (without modification and without 
justification) to the South, But, as we have seen, the 
South was not prepared to be modelled along the path of 
the North. The revival of traditional values and insti- 
tutions, and, especially 'autocratic rule-by-chiefs* was 
not a welcome idea among the Southerners, Moreover, 
indirect rule with its attendant anti-education, anti- 
capitalism and anti-democratic tendencies was unappealing 
to a people in whose hearts progressive trends were be- 
ginning to become firmly entrenched. The appointment 
of chiefs and their assumption of overwhelming judicial 
and executive powers was unacceptable to people who were 
already on the path to absorbing full democratic political 
rule, 
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Many other factors associated with indirect rule 
triggered resentment among Southerners. Not the least 
among them was the change from levying 'indirect tax' to 
’direct taxation’. Payment of indirect taxes simply in 
the form of commercial fees and licences in the South 
dated hack to the inception of colonial rule in I900. 
The tax reflected the degree of entrepreneurial under- 
takings in the region. Hence, the dawn of direct taxation 
- a fixed amount imposed on every household which increases 
with the number of heads in the house - was bound to pro- 
voke Southern reaction. The tax was deemed as a good 
method of bringing the appointed chiefs and their subjects 
closer together.^ Here again, as in other instances, the 
colonialists showed a lack of insight into the damaging 
effects of policies imported from the North. For, in the 
eyes of the Southerners, not only did this tax innovation 
amount to repression, it was considered part and parcel of 
a broader design to subject the South to the dictates of 
the North. The Northerners auid the colonial authorities, 
both adherents of indirect rule, were viewed as collabor- 
ating to subjugate the South. Suffice to say that this 
view that the Northerners were conspirators was very 
dangerous as it paved the way for Southern attacks on 
Northern leadership. 
^Lugard, Lord, Report on Amalgamation of Northern.and 
Southern NigeriaTT Londons Cmd 468, I920, p. 15. 
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The wave of na.tionalist movements which swept 
through South East Asia and Africa following the end of 
World War II intensified the conflict between Northern and 
Southern Nigeria* The South featured prominently in the 
anti-colonial drives but the North remained pro-colonial 
in its attitudes. This has been shown in the case where 
the two regions took opposing stances on the q^uestion of 
the * granting of independence by 1957®• The South favoured 
this move and the North opposed it.^ The objection of the 
North lends further support to Southern allegations of 
Northern collaboration with the colonialists. Suffice 
to say that this antagonism would be extremely difficult 
to erase. The South attacked the North for its pro-colonial 
sentiment and the North counter charged the South for its 
anti-colonial stance. This conflict was nothing short 
of a reflection of fundamental differences stemming from 
the differential colonial experience of the two regions. 
With the seeds of disaster deeply planted, colonial 
rule was termina.ted and independence granted in i960. It 
has been shown in chapter five that conflict and confron- 
tation have been a major characteristic of post-colonial 
relations in Nigeria. Almost all degrees of conflict, 
from the first military coup in I963 (barely four years 
after independence) through tribal masacres in I966 etc. 
^Sklar, Richard L. Nigerian Political Parties. Princetont 
Princeton University I^ess, 1963, p. 126. 
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to the open tribal warfare of I967 to 1970 have occurred 
in the country since independence« We have shown how 
these upheavals have rendered national unity difficult 
to attain. This situation is likely to continue for a 
long time to come. Above all, it has been demonstrated 
that the forces that induce conflict and hence, disunity, 
are the products of colonialism. 
To summarize, modern Nigeria experienced sixty years 
of formal British rule. The North and the South were 
amalgamated without reference to Nigerian views. That 
the traditional histories of the tribal groups and their 
respective colonial experience did not fit them for this 
fate is self-evident. Colonial rule made no attempt to 
integrate the various tribal communities either before 
or after amalgamtiono Consequently, the communities have 
shared nothing in common other than a common subordination 
to British rule, 
Britain*s legacy in Nigeria has remained visible to 
the present day and is likely to remain so. The structures 
created during colonial rule and inherited at independence 
are not adequate for nation-building. The political 
institutions are still largely fragile and incapable of 
legitimate rule. Similarly, the economic infrastructure 
are not designed to provide strong links between the many 
tribal groups. In material wealth, the South surpasses 
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the North and, power is still unevenly distributed between 
the regions. Considerable educational imbalances still 
exist, with the literacy rate in the South ten times higher 
than the North. Further, a greater part of the North is 
still rural and traditional while the South has taken a 
great leap forward in urbanization and the social furnish- 
ings that come with it. These disparities in degrees of 
modernization have increased diversities in the country 
as a whole. It has widened as well as intensified the 
potential for conflict between the tribal groups. So 
delicate ha.ve these diversities become that it will take 
more than human genius to correct the disequilibrium. 
As we have seen, Nigeria's post independence govern- 
ment actions have appeared unable to avoid sharpening 
tribal feeling. This only serves to remind us that the 
colonial legacy of a Nigerian entity without national 
unity is still a reality. This cannot mean anything else 
but a strong case for reconstituting Northern and Southern 
Nigeria as separate sovereign territories. In this man- 
ner, the Northerners will accept their own responsibilities 
and the Southerners will be free to patronize their cause. 
In effect, we would then have stability in a region that 
has for a long time been torn by tribal conflicts. 
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